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Myself when young did eagerly frequent 
Doctor and Saint, and heard great Argument  
About it and about; but evermore 
Come out by the same Door as in I went1. 
- Omar Khayyám (1048-1131) 
  
 
                                                 
1 Translated by: Edward FitzGerald (1809-1883) 
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Abstract 
 
 
Inviting the public or a targeted group of individuals to submit their ideas or 
solutions to a specific problem or challenge within a predefined period of time is called 
an “idea contest.” Idea contests are the straightforward mechanism to solicit and leverage 
the innovation and the intelligence of thousands of individuals. With the advent of the 
Internet, companies can easily organize idea contests with an easy access for anyone to 
participate from anywhere around the world. A contest organizer needs to design a 
contest so that more individuals are encouraged to participate, generate more innovative 
ideas/solutions, and to remain active throughout the contest. In my dissertation, I explore 
the effects of idea contest parameters –such as award size and structure, contest duration, 
the visibility of submissions, and the feedback- on the participation, motivation, and 
performance of individuals before and after joining a contest. 
Feedback, as the primary focus of my dissertation, is a less studied parameter in 
the context of idea contests. In my first essay, I investigate the relative importance of 
each contest design parameter, particularly feedback, with each other in motivating 
individuals to participate in a contest. In this regard, I both ran a conjoint study among 
real designers and collected online data from 99designs website. Feedback plays an 
important role in increasing the likelihood of participation and the participation rate for 
an idea contest. In the second essay, I explore the effect of two different types of 
feedback –absolute vs. relative- on the performance of participants during an idea contest. 
By running a real contest with participants from a major public university, I measured 
how participants in an idea contest react to different types of feedback. The likelihood of 
revising ideas as well as the quality of ideas submitted were the primary dependent 
variables in this field experiment. 
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Chapter 1 
Idea Contests: Literature review and research gaps 
1 Introduction 
In order to stay competitive, companies need to find promising new ideas which 
could be generated inside of a company by its pool of experts, or be found from outside 
company’s boundaries (Chesbrough, 2006). Nowadays, companies no longer rely only on 
their internal expertise, but rather look into a large and diverse pool of individuals, who 
might have better ideas, to dig up new opportunities. They integrate customers into the 
early stages of innovation process, considering them sources of ideas and solutions for 
new products or even problems a company faces (Leimeister, Huber, Bretschneider, & 
Krcmar, 2009). Accessing such a large pool of individuals would be less costly than 
running internal projects by using only company experts (Bockstedt, Mishra, & Druehl, 
2011; Yang, Chen, & Pavlou, 2009). 
Inviting the general public or a targeted group of individuals to submit their ideas 
or solutions to a specific problem or challenge within a predefined period of time is 
called an “idea contest,” “idea competition,” “innovation contest,” or “innovation 
tournament” (Ebner, Leimeister, & Krcmar, 2009). An idea contest is a well-established 
mechanism and straightforward way to solicit innovation and leverage the intelligence of 
thousands of individuals (Boudreau, Lacetera, & Lakhani, 2011; Terwiesch & Ulrich, 
2009; Terwiesch & Xu, 2008). In the literature, other similar terms such as “Customer 
Idea Contests” (CIC) (Mueller, 2006), “research contest” (Taylor, 1995), “broadcast 
search” (Jeppesen & Lakhani, 2010), or “delegated search” (Erat & Krishnan, 2011) have 
been used, but in this dissertation I will use “idea contest.” 
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The structure of idea contests is common in practice. The organizer of an idea 
contest, who could be any individual, firm, public or private organization, or any non-
profit (Ebner et al., 2009) specifies a problem that is seeking a solution, and then invites 
undefined group of individuals to participate and submit their solutions. In most cases a 
reward is set for the best submission and the winner of a contest. The contest organizer is 
also called “sponsor,” “seeker,” “problem holder,” or “contest holder.” Likewise, any 
individual who is willing to enter an idea contest is called “solver,” “searcher,” 
“contestant,” “participant,” or “worker.” 
There are some common stages in most idea contests (Figure 1.1): 
1) Posting: A contest organizer decides which problem he is looking for solution; 
determines an award for the winner, sets the duration of the contest, and defines other 
details. Then, he posts the problem (typically online) and invites individuals to participate. 
2) Subscribing: Individuals will receive notification about the contest. They 
evaluate contest characteristics such as the definition of the problem, award size etc., and 
decide whether to enter that contest or not.  
3) Submitting: after joining the contest, individuals can submit their ideas or 
solutions within the contest period. In practice, participants are free to submit more than 
one solution during a contest. 
4) Feedback: the contest organizer can evaluate submissions during a contest and 
communicate with participants about their submissions. Participants, also, may have an 
opportunity to make some modifications or improvements to their submissions before the 
contest ends. 
3 
 
 
5) Selecting: after a contest is over, the contest organizer evaluates and screens all 
the submissions by her own expertise or by using a panel of experts, based on some 
defined criteria1. Then, submissions are ranked and the best one is selected as the winner 
of the contest. In practice, selection process could be very time consuming and can take a 
lot of effort, depending on the number of ideas generated in a contest.  
 
With the advent of the Internet, companies can easily organize an idea contest 
with an easy access for individuals to participate from anywhere around the world. By 
running idea contests, companies can invite a large and diverse group of people with 
various level of expertise and skills (Chris Zhao & Zhu, 2014). Contests could be held 
directly by a company itself, or by a third-part provider (Zheng, Li, & Hou, 2011). For 
instance, an idea contest was held by Netflix2, in which anyone who could come up with 
an algorithm to improve Netflix’s recommendation system by at least 10 percent could 
win $1 million dollars (Afuah & Tucci, 2012). InnoCentive3 is operating as a host and 
                                                 
1 Various criteria are used to evaluate the quality of ideas, such as originality, novelty, usefulness (Mueller, 
2006). Piller & Walcher (2006) define the novelty or originality of a submission, usefulness (expected 
customer benefits and number of expected beneficiaries of the idea), and the level of elaboration of the 
submitted idea, as selection criteria. 
2 See www.netflixprize.com 
3 See www.innocentive.com 
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online 
Subscribing 
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contest 
Submitting 
Solvers who 
joined the 
contest are free 
to submit any 
solution or to be 
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winner of the 
contest 
Source: Adapted from Yang et al. (2009) 
Figure 1.1: Common stages in idea contests 
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Figure 1.2: Filtering the submissions to find the best solution 
marketplace of idea contests. It offers any firm having complicated science problems to 
post their challenges on the platform4 with a cash prize defined for the best solution 
(Morgan & Wang, 2010). 99designs5 provides a platform in which designers can submit 
their ideas in response to a customer’s design request, and winners receive cash prizes 
(Boudreau & Lakhani, 2013). More than 300,000 design contests have been held on 
99designs, in various categories such as logo, website, business card, or book design. 
The contest organizer may receive many submissions by the end of a contest. By 
filtering and screening submissions, the number of submissions will be narrowed down to 
fewer ones (Figure 1.2). Filtering levels depend on the nature of a contest and a 
company’s decision. The ultimate goal is to find the best solution, which can solve a 
predefined problem. 
 
                                                 
4 “Traditionally, software was developed for specific platforms, such as Windows, Linux, or Mac OS. 
Today, developers build Web-based applications that run on the Web, that are completely independent of 
the user's actual computer operating system.” A platform is a system which could be programmed and 
customized by users to target specific needs (“What is web as a platform? Webopedia Definition,” n.d.). 
5 See www.99designs.com 
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Designing an effective idea contest which encourages individuals to 
participate is very important for researchers (Füller, 2010; Howe, 2008; Leimeister 
et al., 2009; Morgan & Wang, 2010; Terwiesch & Ulrich, 2009; Zheng et al., 2011; 
Zwass, 2010). However, an optimal design is “a hard problem in that no solution 
works over all environments and the particular context needs to be considered” 
(Boudreau, Lakhani, & Menietti, 2016). To receive adequate and acceptable 
submissions from individuals, a contest organizer faces some questions with respect 
to how to design an idea contest (Boudreau & Lakhani, 2013; Wooten & Ulrich, 
2013).6 
Why is designing an idea contest so important to an organizer? First, since 
typically idea contests are announced in an open call, an organizer needs to have an 
attractive enough contest to draw the attention of potential participants. Having more 
participants in a contest increases the quantity and diversity of solutions (Terwiesch & 
Xu, 2008), which leads to finding better solutions to a problem (Yang et al., 2009), and 
few exceptional solutions (Terwiesch & Ulrich, 2009). Thus, attracting more participants 
would be beneficial for a contest organizer and this is only possible by designing a better 
and more effective contest. Second, the design of an idea contest may impact the 
performance and behavior of individuals within a contest. The contest organizer must 
encourage individuals to participate and generate better solutions, and to remain active 
throughout the contest. 
                                                 
6 Adamczyk, Bullinger, & Möslein (2012) clustered five research categories that idea contests are studied 
in the literature: economic perspective, management perspective, education focus, innovation focus, and 
sustainability focus. In each category, the past research has been shown along with the future paths to 
investigate more on how to design an effective idea contest. 
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All in all, the goal in any idea contest is to attract more participants, to motivate 
them to generate acceptable solutions, and to increase the quality of their submissions 
(Mueller, 2006). Thus, the success of an idea contests is measured based upon those 
individuals who join the contest and contribute (Adamczyk, Bullinger, & Möslein, 2012). 
In order to find out how to design an effective idea contest, we need to fully understand 
four important questions (Figure 1.3): 
1) Why individuals are willing to enter an idea contest? What are their motivations? 
2) How does the design of an idea contest influence their decisions to enter? 
3) How does the design impact the performance of individuals during a contest? 
4) How does the design make individuals behave differently within a contest? 
To answer the first question, we need to explore motivation theories and find out 
what motivations would drive individuals to participate in an idea contest. 
2 Motivation Theories 
Without understanding what motivates individuals to participate in idea contests, 
it is not possible for companies to design efficient contests (Archak, 2010; Chris Zhao & 
Zhu, 2014; Ebner et al., 2009). It is a key challenge, specifically, for companies using 
idea contests to incentivize the crowd to propose and generate creative ideas or solutions 
(Piller & Walcher, 2006). Individuals who participate in an idea contest have different 
motivations categorized into intrinsic or extrinsic type. Intrinsic motivation is defined as 
1) What are the 
motivations of 
individuals who 
participate in idea 
contests? 
2) How does 
design of a contest 
affect the decision 
of individuals to 
enter? 
3) How does 
design influence 
the performance of 
individuals during 
a contest? 
4) How does 
design influence 
the behavior of 
individuals during 
a contest? 
Figure 1.3: Four questions that help to design a better idea contest 
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performing a task or activity due to its inherent enjoyment and satisfaction, whereas, 
extrinsic motivation refers to performing an activity for the sake of an external outcome 
which is set by someone other than the individual who is doing that activity (Deci, Betley, 
Kahle, Abrams, & Porac, 1981; Deci & Ryan, 1975; Ryan & Deci, 2000). 
By surveying real participants in idea contests, research has identified different 
motivations. For instance, Zwass (2010) named some of these motivations such as 
“altruistic desire to contribute, passion, enjoyment, self-expression, identity construction, 
forming personal relationships, competitive spirit, learning, self-esteem and self-efficacy, 
desire for social standing and recognition, peer recognition, career advancement, 
signaling to potential employers and investors, financial rewards.” 
Lakhani, Jeppesen, Lohse, & Panetta (2007) studied problem-solving contests and 
discovered some important extrinsic and intrinsic motivations such as winning an award 
money, career and professional reputation concerns, peer and work pressure, enjoyment 
of solving a problem, being the first to solve a challenge, beating other solvers, or even 
having a free time or capacity. Leimeister et al. (2009) relating to sport competitions 
identified some important incentives that individuals have in idea contests such as 
learning (acquiring knowledge from peers and/or experts), direct compensation (i.e. 
prize), self-marketing (an incentive that enables individuals to present themselves and 
their skills/knowledge), and social motives (appreciation by peers and/or the sponsor). 
Some research identified different categories for the motivations of individuals. 
Ke & Zhang (2009) based on the self-determination theory, categorized such motivations 
and put those into four different types: external motivation (i.e. extrinsic motivation), 
identified extrinsic motivation (i.e. social identification), integrated extrinsic motivation 
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(i.e. ideology conviction), and intrinsic motivation, which affect the effort intensity of 
individuals, make them reveal their knowledge in an idea contest. Likewise, Chris Zhao 
& Zhu (2014), introduced the following categorization of motivations: External 
motivation, Introjected motivation, Identified motivation, Integrated motivation, and 
Intrinsic motivation. 
Nonetheless, some research has been done to investigate which type of motivation 
is mostly driving participation in idea contests. For instance, Zheng et al. (2011) 
empirically studied the role of intrinsic motivation in individuals’ participation and found 
that intrinsic motivation is more important than extrinsic motivation. Contest participants 
in their study were not driven fully by financial rewards. However, other research shows 
that winning an award is the most important motivation for solvers to participate in 
problem-solving contests (Lakhani et al., 2007). 
Keeping in mind that individuals have different and distinct types of motivations, 
companies should have the right mixes of intrinsic and extrinsic motivations in order to 
increase the participation of individuals (Leimeister et al., 2009). How can companies 
induce the right mixes of motivations? Designing the features of an idea contest along 
with the functionality of a platform where the contest could be held, will answer this 
question. For example, since the extrinsic motivators could be in the form of monetary or 
non-monetary rewards like valuable goods or services (Boudreau, Lacetera, & Lakhani, 
2008; Brabham, 2010; Piller & Walcher, 2006), designing appropriate reward structure is 
crucial. Moreover, when social and intrinsic motivations could be triggered through 
interaction of participants in a community of individuals (Bullinger & Moeslein, 2010; 
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Piller & Walcher, 2006), designing this functionality on an online platform would benefit 
a contest organizer. 
Little research has been done to show that not only the rewarding system is 
important, the tasks and features of a contest are impactful. Based on the job design 
theory, Zheng et al. (2011) proved a positive association between a contest task design 
(e.g. autonomy, variety, and analyzability) and participation motivation. In their research, 
the significant impact of intrinsic motivation on individuals’ participation suggests that 
developing contest tasks and features should be in a way to increase the level of 
autonomy and competency among individuals. This result would help an organizer to 
design a contest and a required online platform. 
In the next section, I will review common design features of an idea contest and 
go over the available studies for each one. I show that how different design features of a 
contest influence the decision to enter a contest –also known as participation intent- as 
well as performance and behavior of contestants within a contest. Further research, yet, 
needs to be done to find the answers of the following questions: 
1) Do the motivations of individuals change over time within an idea contest? 
2) Which type of motivation (intrinsic vs. extrinsic) is induced by each design 
feature? And as a result, does either intrinsic or extrinsic motivation affect each other? 
3) How does each design feature influence the effort and performance of 
individuals within a contest? 
3 Idea Contest Design Parameters 
“Design parameters,” also known as “design measures,” “design elements,” or 
“design characteristics,” which I will use only design parameters in this dissertation, have 
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effects on how individuals perceive incentives, and on their decision to participate in idea 
contests (Leimeister et al., 2009). 
Leimeister et al. (2009) describe some common characteristics of idea contests as 
follows: 
1) Task specificity: which addresses the scope of a problem that a company is 
looking for solutions; 
2) Degree of idea elaboration: which addresses the level of elaboration for 
participants’ ideas; 
3) Organizational appearance: which displays the way participants can submit 
their ideas; 
4) Time line: which shows the start and the end of a contest along with the 
duration of submission phase; 
5) Incentives: which is the prize offered to the winner(s); 
6) Target group: which exhibits participations’ qualification. 
Bullinger & Moeslein (2010) after analyzing fifty-seven real innovation contests 
categorized additional elements for idea contests: 
1) Media: idea contests are run online, offline, or mixed. However, with the help 
of Internet, online media is the best way to run such contests. Media is also 
called nature of competition (Ebner, Leimeister, Bretschneider, & Krcmar, 
2008), in the literature; 
2) Organizer: which could be any individual, company, public/private 
organization, or non-profit; 
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3) Task/Topic specificity: the topic of a contest indicates how specific the task is, 
ranging from low to high specific; 
4) Degree of elaboration: an organizer can ask only for the rough ideas, sketches, 
or for full concepts and prototypes; 
5) Target group: an organizer can call unspecified (open to everyone) or 
specified (limited to a geographic location or specific age, expertise, etc.) 
group of individuals to join a contest; 
6) Participation: which could be individually or in teams; 
7) Contest period: each contest has a predefined duration which varies from very 
short term, short term, to long term, or very long term; 
8) Reward system: which could be fostering extrinsic motivation (in the form of 
monetary award such as money; or non-monetary award such as valuable 
goods) or intrinsic motivation (which is social motivation, reputation among 
peers, and etc.), or mixed; 
9) Community functionality: which is the community application and tools for 
the interaction and communication among participants; 
10) Evaluation: which could be based on self-assessment, peer reviews, by jury of 
experts, or mixed. 
In addition to above design parameters, Adamczyk et al. (2012) introduced some 
novel elements such as: 
1) Attraction: which is to notify potential participants to enter a contest, that can 
be organized online through websites or blogs, or offline using word-of-mouth 
(or both ways); 
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2) Facilitation: which is encouraging participants to contribute and stay active 
with the help of moderators, professionals, or even peers; 
3) Sponsorship: which is getting financial or emotional assistance from outside 
of a contest; 
4) Contest phases: which is the number of rounds in a contest. Contests could be 
run in one or multiple rounds; 
5) Replication: the same idea contest could be repeated biannually, annually or 
even less or more frequently. 
The research on the effect of each design parameter on the participation, 
performance, and behavior of participants is growing interest. In the following, I review 
available research on this topic. 
4 Prior Research on Design Parameters in Contests 
4.1 Award Size and Structure 
A rich body of literature has been developed in social and psychology science 
investigating the effect of extrinsic motivation, e.g. monetary reward, on the intrinsic 
motivation of individuals. The same idea has been tested in innovation competition 
context, where the research shows that higher reward size will attract more individuals 
(Lee, Chan, Ho, Choy, & Ip, 2015; Yang et al., 2009). Higher rewards not only may 
increase the number of submissions, submissions with higher quality would increase as 
well (Archak, 2010; Liu, Yang, Adamic, & Chen, 2014).7 However, greater amount of 
award could be detrimental since it induces so much effort that participants must be 
compensated (Connelly et al. 2014). 
                                                 
7 Higher reward attracts better and experienced participants (Liu, Yang, Adamic, & Chen, 2014). 
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DiPalantino & Vojnovic (2009) found that participation rate in idea contests 
would increase logarithmically as a function of the reward size offering by an organizer. 
They posit that below a certain amount of reward size, individuals would not participate 
in contests; high skilled individuals only choose contests with higher award size, while 
lower skilled ones participate more broadly. Some studies, however, demonstrate that 
monetary award is not an important incentive for individuals in idea contests and higher 
award size may not lead to higher number of submissions (Yang, Adamic, & Ackerman, 
2008a). 
In idea contests8, when the contestants are risk-neutral, the winner-takes-all award 
structure would be optimal. This structure encourages contestants with higher level of 
expertise to exert more effort while multiple-prize structure would attract individuals 
with lower level of expertise as well (Terwiesch & Xu, 2008).9 In contests with large 
number of participants, due to externality effect and diversity, fixed-price award structure 
is preferable, while in small contests, performance-contingent award10 would lead an 
organizer to have better solutions, more profits, and a more efficient contest (Terwiesch 
& Xu, 2008). 
Archak & Sundararajan (2009), based on a game theoretic model, demonstrate 
that contest organizer depending on the risk aversion of participants should allocate the 
prize of a contest among winners. For instance, when participants are risk-neutral, the 
organizer should have a single prize that goes to the top participant. However, while the 
participants are risk-averse, it is optimal to offer multiple prizes, which “the optimal prize 
                                                 
8 In ideation projects 
9 In expertise-based projects 
10 For expertise-based projects performance-contingent award may not work, but for both ideation and 
trial-and-error projects, performance-contingent award is efficient.  
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amounts exhibit the exponentially decreasing marginal utility pattern and each new prize 
should have approximately twice higher marginal utility than the prize immediately 
above it.” 
In a maze-solving experiment, Freeman & Gelber (2010) examine behavior of 
participants under three different structures of prize in the experiment, when a 
performance feedback was present (or absent). They used three prize structures as piece 
rate (independent of participants’ performance), single large prize, and multiple 
differentiated prizes. The output of experiment was lowest under piece rate, higher under 
single prize, and highest under multiple prizes. When participants found out about how 
well others and they performed in the first round of experiment, low ability individuals 
increased effort and performance under multiple-prize condition –than with single prize. 
Moreover, high ability individuals performed similarly in both prize structure conditions, 
and in the absence of performance feedback, the output of low and high ability 
individuals were quite the same in both conditions. Moreover, when performance 
feedback was not provided low ability individuals did not give up on winning a single 
prize. 
Furthermore, Erat & Krishnan (2011) based upon a theoretical model point out 
three conditions under which a seeker, in a delegated search, benefits from more 
approaches that individuals take to solve a problem, and thus, should employ multiple 
award structure: 1) when the seeker has uncertainty about the quality of solutions, and 2) 
has moderately specified the problem to solvers (not fully or poorly specified), and 3) the 
problem allows divergent solution approaches.  
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In economics literature, the research demonstrates how to design an efficient 
contest11 by modifying the prize scheme (Riis, 2010; Sisak, 2009). For instance, single 
prizes are efficient in contests when individuals are risk-neutral and symmetric, but for 
risk-averse and asymmetric contestants multiple prizes would be optimal. Furthermore, 
having more participants in a contest makes the multiple prizes scheme optimal. Fullerton, 
Linster, McKee, & Slate (2002) studied two types of prize structures in their research: 
first-price auctions and fixed prizes. They tested that auctions are better than fixed prizes 
when there are only two competitors and they follow symmetric strategies. 
Some research has been done on award size and structure of sales contests (Kalra 
& Shi, 2001; Lim, Ahearne, & Ham, 2009; Murphy, Dacin, & Ford, 2004). However, 
there are some differences between sales contests and idea contests. First, the goal in 
sales contests is to maximize the effort of all salespersons while in idea contests the value 
of highest performance is supposed to be maximized. Second, participation in sales 
contest is mandatory but in idea contests individuals voluntarily participate and 
contribute to a contest. Third, the outcome and effort of individuals in sales contests is 
measurable whereas in idea contests the quality of submissions is subjective and 
measured by a jury of experts, and does not depend on how much effort is put (Boudreau 
et al., 2011; Morgan & Wang, 2010; Terwiesch & Xu, 2008). 
Award size and its structure is the most important incentive for individuals in idea 
contests. However, more research should be done, empirically or theoretically, to 
investigate: 
                                                 
11 Small number of economic papers applied the R&D and innovation setting in their studies to find the 
optimal design of an innovation contest (Che & Gale, 2003; Fullerton & McAfee, 1999). 
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1) How does the structure of rewarding system (fixed-price, multiple-price, 
performance-contingent award and etc.) affect the decision of individuals to enter a 
contest? Which structure attracts more individuals? 
2) How does reward structure impact the type of individuals (in terms of 
experience and skill) who may join a contest? How do more experienced and skilled 
individuals react to different reward structures before joining a contest? 
3) How does the size and structure of a rewarding system influence the effort and 
performance of individuals (with different level of experience and expertise) during a 
contest? Do contestants behave differently under different reward systems during a 
contest?12 
4) Does the size and structure of reward affect the intrinsic motivation of 
individuals (with different level of experience and expertise) and how? 
4.2 Intensity of Competition 
The research has shown that competition triggers the sense of challenge (or 
excitement) in individuals, promotes their intrinsic motivation, and encourages them to 
participate (Tauer & Harackiewicz, 2004). On the contrary, competition could undermine 
the intrinsic motivation and lower the rate of participation (Deci et al., 1981). In practice, 
sponsors encourage large number of individuals to enter a contest. However, the 
economic research shows that restricting the entry would be optimal since with greater 
participation, the likelihood of winning for every individual will be relatively small and 
the investment of winner will be low (Che & Gale, 2003). Likewise, Taylor (1995) points 
out that the design of contest would be optimal if the contest organizer offers a proper 
                                                 
12 I investigate this question based on few research studies in the next section. 
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prize, limits the number of participants, and charges each individual an entry fee in order 
to extract all individuals surplus. In a study, Fullerton & McAfee (1999) show that the 
optimal number of competitor is two.  
Nonetheless, Terwiesch & Xu (2008) claim that attracting more participants may 
lead to more diverse solutions, which mitigates the effect of underinvestment when there 
is a large group of individuals competing, with the optimal entry fee of zero. Boudreau et 
al. (2011) posit that greater intensity of competition reduces the motivation of all 
participants to put effort since winning would be less likely for an individual, but at the 
same time, adding more participants increases the likelihood of finding at least one 
extreme-value solution as the “parallel path effect”13 for a contest organizer. By 
considering the uncertainty of a problem as a moderator, they believe that when the 
uncertainty of a problem is high, adding more competitors in idea contests increases 
overall contest performance, and top performers would exert more effort. Uncertainty in 
idea contests arises from the nature of a problem, which is not clear which approach 
should be taken to find its solution, the unknown return of each possible approach, and 
not knowing who would be the winner and how good the solutions of other contestants 
would be. 
Particularly, individuals tend to invest less time and effort as the rivalry increases 
and consequently their likelihood of winning diminishes (Boudreau et al., 2011; 
Natalicchio, Messeni Petruzzelli, & Garavelli, 2014; Terwiesch & Xu, 2008). 
Nonetheless, Boudreau et al. (2016) illustrate that adding more participants in an idea 
contest has different effects on other participants’ level of effort. For instance, since low 
                                                 
13 Participants in a contest try independent experiments, independent approaches, or “parallel paths” to find 
the best solution for the contest problem. 
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ability participants are aware of their low chance of winning, increasing the level of 
competition has little effect on their likelihood of winning and effort level. However, a 
high ability participant, in order to maintain her position against other competitors, 
increases her level of effort when the number of competitors increases. 
All in all, more research needs to be done to find: 
1) How does the number of individuals already joined a contest (as an indicator of 
competition intensity) affect the decision of new individuals who may join a contest? 
How about the type of potential contestants (in terms of experience and expertise) who 
may join? 
2) How does the change in intensity of competition during a contest affect the 
performance of individuals (with different level of experience and expertise)? 
3) How does the change in intensity of competition during a contest make 
individuals (with different level of experience and expertise) behave differently during a 
contest? 
4) How does the intensity of competition influence the intrinsic motivation of 
individuals (with different level of experience and expertise) during a contest? 
4.3 Complexity 
Zheng et al. (2011) define contest complexity as “the degree of difficulty of 
performing the necessary tasks inherent in a solution to the contest.” They consider two 
dimensions of complexity: analyzability, which refers to “the availability of concrete 
knowledge about task activities and the degree of complexity of the search process in 
performing the task,” and variability, which refers to “the frequency of unexpected and 
novel events and contingencies that may occur when an individual engages in a task.” 
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Complexity at first might affect the intrinsic motivation positively since it increases the 
level of challenge or activation for individuals. Later on, the higher the complexity is, the 
higher the cognitive load would be, which makes the individuals lose their interest or 
enjoyment in doing a task (Morgeson & Humphrey, 2006; Wood, 1986).  
Future research should explore the effect of complexity on the decision, 
performance, and behavior of individuals before and after joining a contest in greater 
details. Although, a contest organizer cannot change the nature of a problem, he can 
narrow the focus of a complex problem to reduce the time and effort of participants 
(MacCormack, Murray, & Wagner, 2013).  
4.4 Problem Specification 
The lack of adequate specification for a problem in an idea contest, would avoid 
individuals to participate since it diminishes the likelihood of finding a solution. On the 
other hand, when a problem is well specified, it is easy for the individuals to participate 
and find a proper solution, but they do not try other possible approaches to find better 
solutions. Thus, moderately specifying a problem would be a strategic way for a seeker to 
make individuals participate and browse more of the solution space to find an acceptable 
solution (Erat & Krishnan, 2011). Sometimes, companies narrow the focus of the 
problem in order to reduce the time and effort of the participants to find solutions 
(MacCormack et al., 2013). Yang et al. (2009) found that contests with shorter 
description would attract more individuals to participate. More research should 
investigate how problem specification changes the number of participants and the quality 
of submissions at the end of a contest.  
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4.5 Target Group of Potential Contestants 
Many idea contests involve an open call to any and all contestants. By inviting a 
large unstipulated population to participate in a contest, an organizer may receive more 
solutions with higher diversity, which may bring the organizer better solutions as well. 
By increasing the number of participants, the possible approaches that they try out to 
discover a specific solution would increase too. However, which group of solvers could 
come up with successful solutions? Unlike the common expectation that individuals who 
are core to a problem are able to find viable solutions, those individuals who are distant 
in terms of technical expertise or in terms of a professional community, approach a 
problem with different perspectives (Jeppesen & Lakhani, 2010). Hence, although having 
a targeted group of individuals in terms of knowledge and expertise seems promising in 
finding a successful solution, external solvers (i.e., “outsiders”) possess alternative 
approaches that could lead to a better solution. 
4.6 Participation 
Hutter, Hautz, Füller, Mueller, & Matzler (2011) defined a term “communition” 
as a combination of collaboration and competition for awards in an online community. 
Based on data from OSRAM LED contest community, they found a positive correlation 
between collaboration of competing individuals and the quality of submissions. Those 
ideas submitted through collaboration and competition demonstrated a higher chance of 
being ranked as better ideas. Bullinger, Neyer, Rass, & Moeslein (2010) by analyzing 
data from a community-based innovation contest held at a public university in Germany, 
found that if there is cooperation among participants in an idea contest, the 
innovativeness of submissions is influenced in a U-shaped form: individuals with very 
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low and very high “cooperative orientation” can deliver highly innovative solutions. 
However, future research is needed to demonstrate whether working in teams during an 
idea contest is better than working individually, and how the performance and outcome of 
teams vs. individuals differ.  
4.7 Contest Duration  
Contest period is the time left till the end of a contest. Longer contest duration 
attracts more solvers (Walter & Back, 2011; Yang et al., 2009) since in short period of 
time it might be hard for solvers to propose solutions. On the other hand, the longer a 
period of a contest is, the more likely other participants are able to join a contest. Hence, 
contest duration may indicate a possible level of competition in a contest. According to 
the research, solvers prefer contests with fewer participators in order to increase their 
chance of winning (Yang, Adamic, & Ackerman, 2008b). Therefore, longer duration of a 
contest could be a negative signal for potential solvers as well.  
Future research should address how the duration of a contest influences the 
decision of individuals to enter a contest, and their performance and strategic behavior 
during a contest.  
4.8 Community Functionality 
Community functionality is the application of a platform, where contest is running, 
that supports communication and interaction among participants, facilitates information 
exchange, and helps participants to provide feedback and comments on each other 
submissions (Piller & Walcher, 2006). Ebner et al. (2009) point out that proper 
communication tools and trust-supporting elements help an organizer to build a 
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successful idea contest. Feedback mechanism could be set up in order to cultivate an 
environment that is more favorable to sharing and exchanging information. 
Feedback can motivate individuals to contribute more in idea contests (Yang et al., 
2009), and lack of such interaction may lead to a lower sense of community among 
individuals (Djelassi & Decoopman, 2013; Lakhani et al., 2007). However, Leimeister et 
al. (2009) found that appreciation from other contestants is less significant for individuals 
in idea contests because it is more important for them to receive appreciation from the 
“right” persons who could be the judges and/or the contest organizer. 
 In idea contests, a contest organizer decides whether to provide feedback to any 
participant during a contest. It is a managerial decision that might affect the participation 
of individuals as well as their performance of generating innovative ideas (Wooten & 
Ulrich, 2014). Nonetheless, future research should investigate 
1) How does the community functionality affect the decision of individuals to 
enter a contest? 
2) How does feedback (either peer feedback or the judges’ feedback) influence 
the performance of individuals during a contest? 
4.9 Evaluation 
Evaluation of submissions could be based on self-assessment, peer reviews, 
or a panel of experts. For instance, Threadless14, an innovative Chicago-based 
company, invites designers to create and submit their designs for T-shirts. Hundreds 
of thousands individuals interested in designing have joined Threadless community. 
Community members make comments and provide feedback to each other and then, 
                                                 
14 See www.threadless.com 
23 
 
 
Threadless, based on the public votes and community feedback, selects best designs, 
prints on clothing and iPhone cases, and sells them worldwide (Brabham, 2010; 
Lakhani & Panetta, 2007).  
Evaluation is part of idea selection as one of the important stages of an idea 
contest. For more details, we can refer to Ozer (2005) who reviewed all the idea 
selection approaches with their benefits and limitations, in different disciplines. Yet, 
the question of whether type of evaluation in an idea contest could influence the 
decision, performance, and behavior of individuals needs future research.  
4.10 Variety 
Variety is defined as the degree to which a contest requires its participants to use 
different skills and to perform a variety of activities during the contest. If individuals 
utilize more skills to find a solution in a contest, they feel more challenged and 
experience more enjoyment during that contest (Zheng et al., 2011). However, Yang et al., 
(2008a) found that when a contest problem requires a high level of skills and expertise, it 
negatively affects the number of solvers entering the contest. The variety of skills should 
be related with the complexity of a problem and needs to be investigated more in details.  
4.11 Visibility of Entries 
An idea contest could be blind or unblind and a contest organizer, in practice, is 
able to choose between either type to design a contest. In blind contests, the visibility of 
any submission is limited only to its owner and the contest organizer. Most of the time, 
such contests are single entry and no feedback is provided on submission during the 
contest. On the contrary, in unblind contests, all participants are able to see all the 
submissions. Individuals can monitor other contestants’ solutions and feedback, and use 
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such information to create new ideas or to revise their own solutions (Bockstedt et al., 
2011).  
It is argued that greater entry visibility in idea contests (i.e. unblind contests) may 
result in more participation rates, and hence, more generation of ideas with higher quality 
(Wooten & Ulrich, 2013). However, Jian, Li, & Liu (2013) by framing an analytical 
model and testing the results in a lab experiment, demonstrate that blind contests lead to 
higher quality best solutions than unblind contests, and are more efficient. In addition, 
they posit that when the number of participants goes up, the efficiency of unblind 
contests diminishes and participants reduce their performance. 
Unblind contests only might have an intellectual property issue in which solvers 
may perceive that their ideas could be stolen by other participants. Therefore, most 
solvers may refuse to enter unblind contests. Nonetheless, the research on this topic is 
scant and needs more investigations in order to see the effect of contest type on the 
decision of individuals before joining a contest, and their performance and behavior 
during a contest. 
5 Tactical Behavior by Contestants 
Individuals with different levels of experience and expertise may behave 
differently in an idea contest, depending on various design parameters. Bockstedt et al. 
(2011) define four dimensions that capture the participation strategy of individuals during 
a contest: timing of first entry (i.e., when an individual starts participation in a contest), 
number of entries (i.e., how many submissions the individual submits), range of entries 
(i.e., how long an individual stays active), and the skewness of entries (i.e., how entries 
are distributed throughout individual’s active participation). Also, they measured prior 
experience of an individual in an idea contest by the number of contests she participated 
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(participation experience) and the number of contests she won so far (winning 
experience). 
Yang et al. (2008b) analyzed participants on two Chinese platforms (Witkeys and 
Taskcn) and found that only very small core of successful users contributes about 20% of 
the winning solutions on the platforms. Individuals who win contests tend to participate 
in less popular tasks over time, select contests with greater winning chance, and submit 
their solutions later than other contestants (different timing of first entry). Most active 
solvers on those platforms turn into inactive after performing in different contests. In 
another study by DiPalantino & Vojnovic (2009) based on real data from Taskcn website 
and a theoretical model, individuals would not participate in those contests that have a 
reward below a certain amount of reward size. Furthermore, high skilled individuals only 
choose contests with higher award size, while lower skilled ones participate in broader 
contests. 
Archak (2010) after crawling TopCoder website found out that the more expertise 
an individual has, the more challenging contests she selects to join, and they move first in 
the registration phase of the contest and signing up early for particular projects. Bockstedt 
et al. (2011) found that individuals, who enter an unblind contest earlier, submit multiple 
entries, have a greater range of entries, or their submissions are positively skewed in the 
contest, are more likely to win. Moreover, they observed that even though both 
participation and winning experience increases the winning likelihood for an individual, 
winning experience matters more. Their finding is contrary to the research by Bayus 
(2013) that shows past success hinders the future success in generating innovative ideas. 
26 
 
 
Liu et al. (2014) with a theoretical study and data from Taskcn observed that 
experienced users are more likely to choose contests with a higher award than 
inexperienced ones, and submit their solutions relatively late. Their findings show that 
higher reward absorbs better workers. However, high-quality users would not enter a 
contest where a high-quality solution has been submitted, which results in lower quality 
submissions at the end of the contest. Additionally, experienced users are more likely to 
choose contests with a higher probability of winning.  
6 Discussion 
In this chapter, I reviewed the research about the effect of contest design 
parameters on the participation, performance, and behavior of individuals before and 
after joining a contest. In addition, I introduced possible research questions not 
investigated yet for each parameter. The available research and studies were discussed for 
some design parameters such as award size and structure, intensity of competition, 
complexity of the task/project, problem specification, target group of participants, type of 
participation, contest duration, feedback, evaluation, variety of skills, and the visibility of 
entries.  
Understanding the importance of each design parameter would help a contest 
organizer to design a better and more effective contest, which attracts more participants 
and motivates them to contribute and generate higher quality of submissions. However, 
some other parameters such as attraction, facilitation, sponsorship, contest phases, and 
replication have not yet been studied and need further investigation. As a primary focus 
of my dissertation, I try to explore the effect of feedback, as one of the design parameters 
neglected in the research and practice of idea contests, on the likelihood of participating 
and participation rate as well as the performance of individuals during a contest. 
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7 Outline of Dissertation 
In the essay found in chapter 2, my objective is to find the importance of each 
design parameter in attracting solvers to participate in an idea contest. Different design 
parameters of an idea contest such as the award size, contest duration, contest type (blind 
vs. unblind), and feedback system may be varied to discover their effects on individuals’ 
participation in a contest. Real designers on 99designs website were recruited to 
participate in an experiment to get insight about how to design each parameter to attract 
participation in an idea contest. I both ran a conjoint study among real designers and 
collected online data from 99designs website. Feedback, as one of the design parameters, 
may affect participation as much as other contest design parameters. 
In the essay of chapter 3, I explore the effect of two different types of feedback 
(absolute vs. relative) on the performance of participants in an idea contest. By running a 
real idea contest with participants from a major public university, I measured how 
participants in an idea contest react to different types of feedback. The likelihood of 
revising ideas as well as the quality of ideas participants submitted were the primary 
dependent variables in this field experiment.
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Chapter 2 
How to Attract More Participants in an Idea Contest? 
1 Introduction 
Idea contests have a long history and been practiced in various real situations. In 
the days when navigators were facing a big problem of longitude measurement, the 
British government offered a prize for a practical method to determine the longitude of a 
ship during a sea voyage. It was one of the very first idea contests of the time. Many 
ideas were proposed to solve this problem, but eventually, John Harrison –a self-educated 
English carpenter and clockmaker- won the contest and received £15,315 in 1765.1 
Napoleon Bonaparte, as another example, during his conquests offered a cash prize of 
12,000 francs for a new method of preserving foods for his army. Known as the "father of 
canning," Nicolas Appert was the one who finally solved this problem in 1810.2 
Emerging technologies, especially the Internet, have facilitated the deployment of 
idea contests by companies these days. Many companies have embraced such contests to 
acquire new solutions for their innovation related problems and challenges. The pivotal 
need of a company is always to find innovative ideas and opportunities to sustain its 
competitiveness (Chesbrough, 2006). Having been relying merely on internal R&D 
activities for innovation, companies nowadays are able to access greater external sources 
of information through idea contests. Running idea contests is an easy way to combine 
the efforts of a large and diverse pool of individuals and to solicit their knowledge 
(Boudreau et al., 2011; Boudreau & Lakhani, 2013). Companies have been using idea 
contests to resolve a variety of problems. 
                                                 
1 See en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Longitude_prize 
2 See en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nicolas_Appert 
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For instance, Netflix, an online DVD-rental and video streaming company, 
offered $1 million for the best algorithm to predict user ratings for its online films.3 
NASA has embarked to find “innovative solutions to research and technology problems 
that impact human health and performance in short and long duration human spaceflight” 
through idea contests.4 One of the recent contests is the Google Lunar X Prize. Thirty 
million dollars is offered as a prize by Google to invite teams from all around the world 
to 1) land a robot safely on the Moon, 2) move 500 meters on, above, or below the 
Moon’s surface; and 3) send back HDTV Mooncasts for everyone to enjoy.5 Such 
contests are sometimes organized by a third party instead of a focal company. For 
example, InnoCentive, NineSigma, Kaggle, and Yet2.com are online platforms hosting 
idea contests and allow other companies to post their problems on their websites. 
As the focus of my research, 99designs6 is also an idea contest marketplace that 
allows users to create contests in which everyone interested in designing can submit 
design ideas for evaluation. “Design contests are what we’re known for –it’s that kind of 
crowd source element: post your job, get sent ideas, and pick the one you like,” says 
Patrick Llewellyn, the CEO and president of 99designs. Contests on 99designs, for 
instance, are within different design categories such as logo, website, business card, book 
etc. Over thirty thousand designers are active on 99design platform and also, over three 
hundred thousand contests have been held, up to now. 
But how can a company run such contests to receive remarkable solutions and 
ideas? Since, in most of the time, an idea contest is in the form of an open call and 
                                                 
3 See www.netflixprize.com 
4 See www.nasa.gov/open/plan/open-innovation.html 
5 See lunar.xprize.org 
6 See www.99designs.com 
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everyone is invited to enter, attracting more individuals should be the first objective for a 
contest organizer. The research posits that attracting more participants increases the 
quantity and diversity of solutions (Terwiesch & Xu, 2008), which leads to finding better 
solutions to a problem (Yang et al., 2009), and to few exceptional solutions (Terwiesch & 
Ulrich, 2009). The focal point of this chapter is to find out how to increase the 
participation rate of an idea contest. In this regard, we need to understand first, why 
people participate in idea contests and what their motivations are, and second, how to 
design an idea contest in terms of its design parameters and characteristics.  
The motivations of individuals who join idea contests are investigated in the 
literature and were discussed in the previous chapter as well. However, in order to study 
how to design different contest parameters and how individuals may react to the design of 
a contest and decide to enter that contest, I invited real designers on 99designs website to 
participate in a conjoint study. In my study, I evaluated the relative importance of each 
design parameter with each other (especially the feedback system) in motivating 
participation. Besides, I collected online data on 99designs website to explore how 
different contests with distinctive design parameters have different participation rates. 
The number of new participants who join a contest every day (i.e. participation rate) may 
depend on the design parameters of the contest.    
2 Motivations of Participants 
As discussed in the previous chapter, participants might have various motives to 
participate in a contest categorized into two groups: intrinsic and extrinsic motivations. 
Pleasure from solving problems, sense of pride from winning a competition, the 
opportunity to develop skills and gain experiences, learning, altruism, and self-efficacy 
are examples of intrinsic motivations. Whereas, making money, building reputation, and 
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appreciation by the contest organizer or other solvers (peers) are examples of extrinsic 
motivations (Brabham, 2010; Lakhani & Panetta, 2007; Leimeister et al., 2009; Zhao & 
Zhu, 2012b; Zheng et al., 2011).7 Both intrinsic and extrinsic motivations play important 
roles in a solver’s decision to join a contest. 
After understanding why individuals participate in such activity, companies need 
to know what steps they should take in order to design an online idea contest. 
3 Designing an Idea Contest 
Bullinger & Moeslein (2010) illustrate ten key elements that determine the design 
of an idea contest. The media: online, offline, or mixed; the organizer which could be any 
individual, company, public/private organization, or non-profit; the task/topic specificity 
that ranges from low to high specific; the degree of elaboration which could be only 
rough ideas, sketches, or for full concepts and prototypes; the target group which could 
be unspecified (open to everyone) or specified (limited to a geographic location or 
specific age, expertise, etc.); the participation: individually or in teams; the contest 
period that varies from very short term, short term, to long term, or very long term; the 
reward system which could in the form of monetary award such as money; or non-
monetary award such as valuable goods) or mixed; the community functionality which is 
the community application and tools for the interaction and communication among 
participants; the evaluation which could be based on self-assessment, peer reviews, by 
jury of experts, or mixed. 
                                                 
7 More research has investigated such motivations: Lakhani et al. (2007), Huberman et al. (2009), Füller 
(2010), Brabham (2010), Kaufmann et al. (2011), Zheng et al. (2011), Afuah & Tucci (2012), Bayus (2013), 
Bloodgood (2013), Boudreau & Lakhani (2013),  Battistella & Nonino (2013), Geiger, Seedorf, Schulze, 
Nickerson, & Schader (2011), Hossain (2012), Zhao & Zhu (2012a, 2012b, 2014). 
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MacCormack et al. (2013) identify five general decisions that an organizer faces 
in designing an idea contest: 
1) Framing the problem: the first step for an organizer in designing a contest is to 
frame a problem. Too complex problems would need lots of time and effort from solvers 
and may not be possible to come up any solution by them. Sometimes, narrowing the 
focus of a problem would help solvers but it may hinder them to browse the solution 
space to find innovative solutions. Nevertheless, without defining and framing a problem 
properly, designing a contest is not feasible. 
2) Establishing a prize: the type, size, and structure of a prize should be decided 
before running a contest. Prizes could be in the form of monetary or non-monetary (i.e. 
valuable goods). For monetary rewards the size (small vs. large) or the structure (winner-
takes-all, multiple-prize etc.) may affect the number, quality, and diversity of solvers who 
join a contest. Competitions with difficult problem to solve need larger award size to 
intrigue more participation. Financial reward, however, is not always the most important 
driver for solvers. Building up reputation, connecting with other individuals, and social 
interactions are other factors that interest potential solvers to participate. 
3) Inviting the participants: an organizer could invite any specific group of 
individuals or open the contest to everyone. The specification of individuals may be 
based on the location, age, gender, skills or expertise. Sometimes, companies set 
prequalification rules for potential participants for the sake of intellectual property 
protection. On the other hand, an open entry contest may end up with an enormous 
number of submissions, which would make it hard to evaluate for the organizer. 
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4) Defining the process: the process determines how participants are able to 
compete in a contest (i.e. individually vs. in teams) as well as the decision about each 
phase of a contest from the beginning to its end. Some companies allow collaboration in a 
contest while others encourage individuals to submit their ideas independently. In 
addition, the decisions about how participants can submit their ideas, the contest duration, 
and how the winner would be selected, are as important and must be decided before 
running a contest. 
5) Building a platform: contests usually are held by a focal company or by a third 
party. Companies should decide on whether they have the necessary infrastructure to run 
a contest or must outsource it to a third-party provider. Accessing a third party to the data 
might raise privacy concerns. However, creating a platform and managing could be costly 
and difficult as well. 
As mentioned, there are plenty of decisions a company has to make in order to 
design a contest. However, an optimal design is a harder problem “in that no solution 
works over all environments and the particular context needs to be considered” 
(Boudreau et al., 2016). For this reason, I selected 99desings platform where thousands of 
idea contests are held every day, to study the effect of design parameters on the 
participation rate of individuals (i.e. how to attract more solvers). My study would benefit 
a typical contest organizer willing to run a design contest on 99designs website as well as 
contribute to the idea contest literature by taking less studied features –such as feedback 
system- into account. 
4 Data Source: 99designs Website 
99designs is an online graphic design platform and marketplace that provides any 
member of its community the ability to create design contests in which anyone who is 
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Figure 2.1: Blind (left) vs. unblind (right) contests 
interested in designing can submit design ideas to win a prize. The contests on 99designs 
fall in different design categories: logo and identity, website and app design, business and 
advertising, clothing and merchandise, art and illustration, packaging and label book and 
magazine. Over thirty thousand designers are active on 99design platform from all 
around the world, and also, over three hundred thousand contests have been held so far. 
Anyone can sign up on the platform as a design expert or a typical design seeker looking 
for a specific design. There is no subscription fee to join this community. 
To launch a design contest on 99designs, a contest organizer should first describe 
her request and what she is looking for, specifically (called “design brief”). Then, she 
should define an award size for the best design, and choose whether her contest to be 
blind or unblind.8 In a blind contest, designers are able to view only their own entries 
whereas in unblind contests everyone is able to see other submissions (Figure 2.1).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8 On 99designs website, it is recommended to have blind contests over unblind since blind contests attract 
higher quality solutions. 
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The standard length for all contests is 7 days; however, the contest organizer can 
extend it up to 10 days. The range of awards varies, typically, from $100 to more than 
$2000 depending upon the project requirements. Designing banners, T-shirts, and 
business cards take less time and effort, whereas, designing a website is more time 
consuming, hence, the award size changes. 
A contest organizer is able to communicate with the contestants in different ways 
(Figure 2.2). Rating the designs, which is based on a star rating (one to five stars) below 
each design thumbnail image. This type of feedback allows designers to know which 
design is preferred by the contest organizer and how to create better designs during a 
contest. Star ratings are publicly visible to everyone even in blind contests where entries 
are hidden. Admittedly, in an unblind contest, a designer can acquire information about 
the preference of a contest organizer by monitoring all the entries and how the contest 
organizer has given feedback to each. Leaving a comment is another way of 
communication between a solver and seeker. This type of communication is only visible 
by the contest organizer and the feedback receiver. A contest organizer can interact with 
contestant and guide them to improve their designs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Different ways of communication  
between a contest organizer and contestants 
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When a designer (i.e. contestant) joins 99designs platform, she can browse among 
ongoing contests to see which contest matches her preferences to work on. There is a 
long list of contests (Figure 2.3) in which designers can sort the contests on the prize size, 
time left, or the number of entries. A typical designer can publicly view some information 
for each contest and consequently make a decision to enter any one that seems more 
attractive (i.e. matches her skills or gives her higher chance of winning). For instance, 
following items are visible to all the users on 99designs: 
1) Prize: prize of all contests are visible to designers and is sortable from low to 
high –usually ranges from $50 to $2000;  
2) The project description and requirements: designers can see which category a 
project belongs to and how difficult it is in terms of the level of time and effort required 
to design the project; 
3) Time left: which indicates when a contest will finish and how much time is left 
to its end; 
4) Number of participants: this is public as a number to everyone; 
5) Number of entries: which shows how many designs have been submitted up 
already by active contestants in a contest; 
6) The visibility of entries: blind contests do not allow designers to view other 
contestants’ entries, but unblind entries are completely visible to public; 
7) The star rating: star rating is public to all designers who can find out whether a 
contest organizer has provided already any feedback to any design/designer; 
8) Number of rated designs: this number shows how many entries contest 
organizer has provided feedback to.  
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Figure 2.3: Illustrative list of contests on 99designs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Now, the questions are, first, how real designers evaluate the public information 
about different design parameters of a contest in deciding whether to participate in a 
contest or not? In other words, which design parameter is more important to real 
designers and may increase the likelihood of selecting a contest by them? Award size 
might be the primary driver for potential participants, however, other parameters such as 
the duration of a contest or the difficulty of a project might influence their decisions as 
well. In the first study of current chapter, I will answer this question by inviting real 
designers on 99designs website to a conjoint study to explore the relative importance of 
each design parameters [of 99designs contests] with each other from real designers’ 
perspective.  
Second, how is a contest organizer, by setting design parameters for her contest, 
able to motivate potential designers to participate in her contest? Motivating more 
designers to participate will lead to having more participation and more submissions 
during a contest. Admittedly, increasing the number of participants will increase the 
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chance of finding the best solution for the contest organizer. For this matter, I looked at 
the number of designers who join contests on 99designs website every day. The number 
of participants who join a contest every day is known as the participation rate. Higher 
participation rate for a contest indicates that more designers are motivated to participate. 
The more a participation rate is, the more participants are entering a contest; the more 
motivating the designs parameters of the contest are for potential participants; and the 
more solutions eventually would be submitted. In particular, on 99designs website, a 
contest organizer needs to increase the participation rate for her contest since there might 
be other contests more appealing to real designers to participate. Having access to the 
data on 99designs website, I will evaluate the relationship between the participation rate 
of some contests and the design parameters of those contests. I argue that different design 
parameters will change the participation rate of a contest because participants evaluate 
those parameters and contemplate each one.   
The answer to these questions would help a contest organizer to better design her 
contest that attracts more solvers and leads her to more solutions.9 In the following, I 
review the literature to demonstrate how design parameters motivate potential individuals 
to participate in an idea contest, and affect the participate rate of a typical contest. 
5 Hypothesis Development for Participation 
In this section, I review the related literature on the effect of each design 
parameter on the participation of solvers. To find the answer for those two questions in 
the last section, I develop two hypotheses for each design parameter. I start with Prize 
which is thought to be the most important motivation of solvers to participate in idea 
                                                 
9 Lack of access to all the information on 99designs would not allow the author to measure the quality of 
entries and the best design at the end of each contest. 
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contests (Lakhani et al., 2007). The research shows that higher reward size will attract 
more individuals (Lee et al., 2015; Yang et al., 2009).10 Nonetheless, greater amount of 
award could be detrimental since it induces so much effort that participants must be 
compensated (Connelly, Tihanyi, Crook, & Gangloff, 2014). DiPalantino & Vojnovic 
(2009) found that participation rate in idea contests would increase logarithmically as a 
function of the reward size offering by an organizer. They posit that below a certain 
amount of reward size, individuals would not participate in contests.  
Since the range of award size on 99designs is usually from $50 to $2000, I cannot 
test whether larger amount of prize could be demotivational for solvers to participate in a 
contest. Thus, according to the literature, I propose: 
 
Hypothesis 1.a: The higher an award size is, the higher the likelihood of 
participation will be for a potential contestant. 
Hypothesis 1.b: The higher an award size is, the higher the participation rate will 
be for a contest. 
 
The second design parameter is “the project description and requirements” which 
defines the difficulty of a project. Zheng et al. (2011) define contest complexity as “the 
degree of difficulty of performing the necessary tasks inherent in a solution to the contest.” 
Complexity first might affect the intrinsic motivation of solvers positively since it 
increases the level of challenge for them. However, the higher the complexity is, the 
higher the cognitive load would be, which makes solvers lose their interest or enjoyment 
in doing a task (Morgeson & Humphrey, 2006; Wood, 1986).  
                                                 
10 DiPalantino & Vojnovic (2009) have found that high skilled individuals only choose idea contests with 
higher award size, whereas lower skilled solvers participate more broadly. Thus, the level of expertise 
could moderate the award size effect.  
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Accordingly, difficulty of a project could have a conflicting effect on the decision 
of participants to enter a contest. In practice, companies narrow the focus of a problem in 
order to reduce the time and effort of participants in a contest (MacCormack et al., 2013). 
Solvers first evaluate the difficulty of a project and examine how much time and effort it 
may take; then, based on their ability and the probable outcome that they may receive, 
decide to enter a contest or not. To see the importance of this parameter I propose: 
 
Hypothesis 2.a: The more a project of a contest is difficult, the lower the 
likelihood of participation will be for a potential contestant. 
Hypothesis 2.b: The more a project of contest is difficult, the lower the 
participation rate will be for a contest. 
 
The third characteristic of time left indicates when a contest will finish and how 
much time is left to its end. Longer contest duration attracts more people (Walter & Back, 
2011; Yang et al., 2009) since in short period of time it may be hard for solvers to 
propose solutions. On the other hand, the longer a period of a contest is, the more likely 
other participants are able to join a contest and the competition would be more intense. In 
addition, research shows that solvers prefer those projects with fewer participators in 
order to increase their chance of winning (Yang et al., 2008b). Therefore, I have: 
 
Hypothesis 3.a: The more the time left is, the higher the likelihood of 
participation will be for a potential contestant. 
Hypothesis 3.b: The more the time left is, the higher the participation rate will be 
for a contest. 
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The fourth design parameter is the number of participants who have joined a 
contest so far, which indicates the level of competition in that contest as well. 
Competition can trigger the sense of challenge (or excitement) in individuals, promotes 
their intrinsic motivation, and encourages them to participate (Tauer & Harackiewicz, 
2004). However, it could undermine the intrinsic motivation and lower the rate of 
participation (Deci et al., 1981). Thus, I state: 
 
Hypothesis 4.a: The more the number of participants is, the lower the likelihood 
of participation will be for a potential contestant. 
Hypothesis 4.b: The more the number of participants is, the lower the 
participation rate will be for a contest. 
 
Number of entries, the fifth parameter, demonstrates how many designs have been 
submitted by the current participants in a contest. The more submissions/entries 
submitted, the more likely at least one of them is able to match the needs and preferences 
of the contest organizer. In other words, more entries show more attempts by participants 
to generate the best design that could satisfy the contest organizer. Therefore, the higher 
number of entries in a contest could signal the higher level of competition and lower 
chance of proposing the winning solution for those individuals who have not yet joined 
the contest. Although, the higher number of participants lead to higher number of entries 
and these two terms could be thought to be equal, there are some real examples on 
99designs website in which two contests with the same number of participants have 
different number of submissions/entries. Thus, I have: 
 
42 
 
 
Hypothesis 5.a: The more the number of entries is, the lower the likelihood of 
participation will be for a potential contestant. 
Hypothesis 5.b: The more the number of entries is, the lower the participation 
rate will be for a contest. 
 
The sixth design parameter, visibility of entries, specifies whether a contest is 
blind or unblind. Greater entry visibility in idea contests results in more participation 
(Wooten & Ulrich, 2013). However, unblind contests might have an intellectual property 
issue and solvers may refuse to enter an unblind contest (Bockstedt et al., 2011). The 
research on this topic is scant and needs further investigations. Therefore, I propose: 
 
Hypothesis 6.a: Switching the visibility of entries from unblind to blind increases 
the likelihood of participation for a potential contestant. 
Hypothesis 6.b: Switching the visibility of entries from unblind to blind increases 
the participation rate for a contest. 
 
Seventh, star rating, which is a communication method (i.e. feedback) between a 
contest organizer and participants, and is publicly visible on 99designs website. Rating a 
design shows whether the contest organizer likes a design or not. This type of feedback 
may encourage designers to create more designs and improve their submissions. In 
addition, it enables participants to understand the preferences of the contest organizer. 
There is no study testing the effect of such feedback on the decision of solvers to enter a 
contest. However, when I put myself in a solver’s shoes, if a contest organizer has 
already provided feedback to any entry, I will enter that contest because the contest 
organizer is already revealing her preferences and it would be easier to find her exact 
need. On the contrary, the argument could be the opposite. When a contest organizer has 
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already provided feedback to any entry, the chance of winning for those participants who 
received feedback (or those already in the contest) could be higher because they can 
create a preferable design sooner than those individuals who have not yet joined the 
contest. Although further research is required for this parameter, I propose: 
 
Hypothesis 7.a: If a contest organizer has already rated any entry, the likelihood 
of participation will be higher for a potential contestant. 
Hypothesis 7.b: If a contest organizer has already rated any entry, the 
participation rate will be higher for a contest. 
 
Eighth, number of rated designs, which someone may argue that the more active a 
contest organizer is in evaluating the submission/entries, the easier for a potential 
participant to address her needs, and therefore, the higher her chance of winning would 
be. Thus, I propose: 
 
Hypothesis 8.a: The more a contest organizer has rated entries, the more the 
likelihood of participation will be for a potential contestant. 
Hypothesis 8.b: The more a contest organizer has rated entries, the more the 
participation rate will be for a contest. 
 
Other users on 99designs can provide feedback on the entries during a contest 
when it is unblind. However, this type of feedback might be nonsense since it is more 
important for participants to receive feedback from the “right” person –a contest 
organizer in this case (Leimeister et al., 2009). Nonetheless, I propose that: 
 
Hypothesis 9: Receiving feedback from other peers in an idea contest increases 
the likelihood of participation for a potential contestant. 
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In practice, some platforms and real idea contests are lacking such communication 
functionality between contest organizers and participants. Besides, peer feedback during 
an idea contest is not a common feature. Therefore, my studies would help contest 
organizers to take advantage of feedback system in their contests as well as to understand 
the effect of design parameters on the motivation and participation of individuals. In the 
next section, based on a conjoint study, real designers on 99designs compare contest 
design parameters with each other and decide whether to participate a contest or not. The 
results are discussed afterwards.  
5.1 Conjoint Study of Participation in Design Contests 
Conjoint analysis is a methodology for the measurement of psychological 
judgments that answers the question of which attributes are important and how important 
they really are (Urban, Hauser, & Urban, 1993). In conjoint experiments, respondents 
express their preferences for “products” (in my study “contests”) described by varying 
levels of attributes. By observing how respondents evaluate contests in response to 
changes in the underlying feature levels, we can estimate the impact of each feature on 
respondents’ judgments. 
One hundred and thirty five designers (80% male) in the age range of 15-52 years 
participated in my conjoint survey (descriptive information in Table 2.1). According to 
the design parameters reviewed, I varied the following features and levels for the design 
of contests:  
1) Type of entries visibility: blind, unblind 
2) Level of project complexity: easy, hard 
3) Feedback system: contest organizer feedback, peers feedback, no feedback 
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4) Award size: $2000, $500, $100 
5) Number of entries to date: 1000, 500, 10 
6) Contest period: 1 day, 6 days 
There are various methods to adopt a conjoint study. In full factorial design, all 
possible combinations of features across all levels are considered. For example, to test the 
impact of each design feature of a contest, I have to create 2 (type of entries visibility) × 
2 (level of task complexity) × 3 (feedback system) × 3 (award size) × 3 (number of 
entries) × 2 (contest period) = 216 possible combinations and ask the respondents to 
identify their preferences for each combination. With this number of combinations, 
participants would be worn out and probably begin giving automatic responses, rather 
than thoughtful evaluations. Hence, I decided to have one feature, number of entries to 
date, instead of two separate variables such as number of entries and number of 
participants. Likewise, number of rated designs is not included in the conjoint study to 
make it less time consuming for the respondents.   
Alternatively, partial factorial design is used when there are many features and it 
is difficult to represent all possible combinations. There are also various methods of 
designing the questions in conjoint analysis. The choice-based conjoint analysis is a 
popular way as it is seen most closely resembling the choices that consumers, for 
example, make when they are purchasing a product. In my study, choices are the contests 
that real designers decide to enter. I used Sawtooth’s Conjoint-Based Choice software to 
create partial factorial design of features for design contests. Thirty profiles were created 
by Sawtooth software and, in order to make the experiment simple and less time 
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consuming, for each question two profiles were presented to the respondents as two 
choices –without “no choice” option (Appendix).  
I invited real designers on 99designs to participate in to compare two different 
hypothetical design contests with each other, and were asked to choose a contest that they 
will participate based on different levels of features presented. In each question they 
chose only one contest while the null choice was not available. At the beginning, all 
features were presented to the respondents and explained in details. 
Table 2.1: Conjoint study sample descriptions 
 Statistics  Statistics 
Total Participants 135   
Gender 
• Female 
• Male 
 
27 (20%) 
108 (80%) 
Age (in Years) 
• Range 
• M 
• Mdn 
• Std 
 
15-52 
30 
28 
7.7 
Education 
• High school 
• Some college 
• Associates 
• BA-BS 
• Master's 
• Doctoral 
• Professionals 
 
20% 
20% 
14% 
47% 
21% 
0% 
13% 
Years active on 99designs 
• Less than a year 
• 1-2 years 
• 2-3 years 
• 3-4 years 
• 4-5 years 
• 5-6 years 
 
30% 
41% 
33% 
10% 
15% 
6% 
 
5.1.1 Data Analysis and Results 
The preference responses of participants along with their demographic 
information were collected. The choices and features were coded as a binary data (Table 
2.2). The choice data were analyzed by means of binary logistic regression. Due to partal 
factorial design of conjoint study, only main effects are estimated. The logit function of 
choice is a linear combination of the attribute variables and a estimate of their 
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coefficients is produced for each attribute level that can be interpreted as an "marginal 
utility" of participating in a contest for the respondents analyzed. 
Table 2.2: Data coding for design parameters and their levels 
Features Levels Coding 
1- Feedback system 
Contest organizer 
feedback 
Peer feedback 
No feedback 
(1,0) 
(0,1) 
(0,0) 
2- Award size 
$2000 
$500 
$100 
(1,0) 
(0,1) 
(0,0) 
3- Number of entries 
1000 
500 
10 
(1,0) 
(0,1) 
(0,0) 
4- Complexity of project 
Difficult 
Easy 
1 
0 
5- Contest period 
6 days 
1 day 
1 
0 
6- Entries visibility 
Blind 
Unblind 
1 
0 
 
The results estimated using R software are shown in Table 2.3. According to the 
theory of planned behavior, an individual actual behavior could be predicated by the 
intention to perform the behavior (Ajzen, 1991; Kim, Ferrin, & Rao, 2008; Zheng et al., 
2011), hence, we can infer that the result of conjoint study not only explains the 
likelihood of participation but also provides insights for the participate rate.  
To test my hypotheses, I rely on the Wald test (Greene, 2008). The baseline for 
award size is $100 which is used as the lowest size. Based on the results, switching the 
award size from the baseline to either $500 or $2,000 level, increases the likelihood of 
selecting a contest (i.e. likelihood of participating) for real designers. For instance, if the 
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reward is switched from the baseline of $100 to $2,000 the log odds of participating in a 
contest increases by 0.99, holding all other independent variables constant. Besides, The 
incremental effect on the probability of participation rises by 0.202 when the reward 
changes from $100 to $2000. The positive and strong coefficients for each award size 
level (β1=0.99, χ2(1)=187.64, p<0.001) supports H1.a. 
Supporting H2.a, the coefficient for the complexity of project indicates that 
designers are more likely to choose an easy contest (β3=-0.23, χ2(1)=8.71, p<0.01) over a 
difficult contest. If we switch from an easy contest to the difficult one, the log odds of 
participating in a contest decreases by 0.23 and the incremental effect of the probability 
of participation alse diminishes by 0.046. Since the coefficient for the variable time left is 
not siginificant (p<0.1) I cannot support or reject H3.a. Larger number of entries in a 
contest has a negative effect on the likelihood of selecting a contest, which supports H5.a 
(β5=-1.59, χ2(1)=312.11, p<0.001). Furthermore, blind contest attracts more designers 
than an unblind contest (β7=0.53, χ2(1)=46.73, p<0.001). If we switch from an unblind 
contest to the blind contest, the log odds of participating in a contest increases by 0.53 as 
well as the incremental effect of the probability of participation which rises by 0.108. 
Hence, H6.a is supported. 
The feedback system has a positive and significant effect on the likelihood of 
selecting and participating in a contest. For instance, if we switch from a contest with no 
feedback feature to a contest in which the organizer has provided feedback to the 
contestants, the log odds of participating in a contest and the incremental effect of the 
probability of participation increases by 1.6 and 0.325, repectively (β8=1.60, 
χ2(1)=211.66, p<0.001). Unlike the common practices in idea contests, the feedback from 
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peers compared to no feedback has a greater effect on the participation of designers. if we 
switch from a contest with no feedback feature to a contest in which the peers provide 
feedback to each other, the log odds of participating in a contest and the incremental 
effect of the probability of participation increases by 0.71 and 0.143, repectively 
(β9=0.71, χ2(1)=51.66, p<0.001). These results support H7.a and H9. 
Table 2.3: Logit regression results for the effect of design parameters on the 
likelihood of participating in a contest 
 Logit Coefficients (β i) 
p-value exp(β i) 
Incremental effect 
on probability of 
Selecting a contest 
Intercept 
-1.07 
(0.14)*** 0.000 0.34  
$2000 (H1.a) 
0.99 
(0.09)*** 0.000 2.71 
0.202 
(0.000) 
$500 
0.91 
(0.09)*** 0.000 2.48 
0.184 
(0.000) 
Difficult (H2.a) 
-0.23 
(0.07)** 0.003 1.25 
-0.046 
(0.000) 
6 days (H3.a) 
-0.14 
(0.07) 0.060 1.15 
-0.028 
(0.000) 
1000 entries (H5.a) 
-1.59 
(0.09)*** 0.000 0.20 
-0.322 
(0.001) 
500 entries 
-0.97 
(0.08)*** 0.000 0.37 
-0.197 
(0.000) 
Blind (H6.a) 
0.53 
(0.08)*** 0.000 1.70 
0.108 
(0.000) 
Contest organizer 
(H7.a) 
1.60 
(0.11)*** 0.000 4.97 
0.325 
(0.001) 
Peers (H9) 
0.71 
(0.09)*** 0.000 2.02 
0.143 
(0.000) 
-2 Log likelihood: 4787.299 AIC: 4807.3 χ2: 76.58 
Standard error in parentheses 
** Significant at p <0.01 
*** Significant at p <0.001 
 
50 
 
 
Consistent with the literature, I found that greater award size increases the 
likelihood of participating in a contest whereas the difficulty of a problem and higher 
number of entries have negative impacts on this likelihood. Real designers in my study 
prefered blind contests over unblind ones. However, whether time left has a positive 
effect on the likelihood of participating in a contest is not supported and needs further 
investigation. 
The important takeaway from the results of this section is the feedback. There are 
many practices in which feedback system has not been used at all. I found that if this 
feature is added to a contest, it increases the likelihood of participating in a contest. Even 
though the feedback from the contest organizer is deemed more valuable to the 
participants, peer feedback also rises the likelihood of participating in a contest and could 
be added to the functionality of an idea contest platform. In the next section, I monitor the 
number of new participants for some design contests on 99designs website and explain 
how the actual participation rate could be affected by the contest design parameters. 
5.2 Participation Rate: An Observational Study 
Every day more than thousand contests are being held on 99designs website. Over 
seven days, the usual contest duration, the number of participants who join contests 
varies. Number of new participants is directly observable online and has different 
patterns seen in Figure 2.4. For instance, for one contest, few individuals may join in the 
first day of the contest, and in other days, no one joins any more. However, for another 
contest, new participants join every day. The number of new participants who join a 
contest every day is known as participation rate. Since users on 99designs website 
evaluate the public information of design parameters and then decide to participate in a 
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Figure 2.4: Examples of number of new participants per day for some 
random contests on 99designs 
contest, which parameter would be influential on the participation rate? Higher rate of 
participation indicates that more designers are willing to participate in a contest. 
Understanding the effect of design parameters on the participation rate of contests on 
99designs website would help a contest organizer to better design her contest. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The data collection process is shown in Figure 2.5. I began tracking the number of 
new participants for two hundred randomly selected contests on 99designs, from the 
beginning of each contest to the end. After I collected the data of contests for seven days 
each, based on different features coded the data. The minimum amount of prize was $189 
and the maximum was $2199. Total designs submitted varied across contests from zero to 
1030. Number of rated designs ranged from zero to 76 designs by a contest organizer. To 
measure the difficulty of each contest, I asked two experienced designers to evaluate the 
difficulty of each project and checked for the inter-rater reliability (Krippendorff’s alpha 
= 0.89) to check the raters’ agreement (Krippendorff, 2007). After interviewing the raters 
about how they define the difficulty feature, the category of a project along with the 
requiring level of time and effort for each contest were used to rate the difficulty of 
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projects. Difficulty was categorized in three different levels: easy, medium, and hard. The 
number of new participants per day was set as the dependent variable. 
 
5.2.1 Data Analysis and Results 
The dependent variable in my study is the number of new participants per day 
(participation rate) and the independent variables are the design parameters –such as 
award size, difficulty of project, time left, the number of current participants, the number 
of entries, the visibility of entries, star rating, and the number of rated designs. I explorer 
whether having larger amount of award in contests increases the rate of participation in 
contests or not. Feedback, in particular, may have a significant effect on the number of 
participants who may join a contest. To analyze the data, I used Negative Binomial 
Regression. In Poisson distribution, the assumption is the mean and the variance are 
equal. However, when the variance of data is greater than the mean (so-called over-
dispersion problem) negative binomial regression is recommended to use. In negative 
binomial regression, the dependent variable is a count variable and the log of expected 
count as a function of independent variables is modeled as a linear function of 
explanatory variables such as design parameters. Therefore, the interpretation of 
coefficients in a negative binomial regression would be as follows: if the independent 
variable is changed by one unit, the difference in the logs of expected counts would be 
Krippendorff's alpha  
Task Difficulty (α =0.89) 
1) Randomly 
selected 200 
design contests 
with different 
design parameters 
2) Asked two 
experienced 
designers to 
evaluate the 
difficulty of 
design projects 
3) Collected the 
data from the 
beginning of each 
contest to the end 
4) Coded the 
features as IV; 
Number of new 
participants per 
day as DV 
Contest duration = 7 days 
Figure 2.5: Data collection process on 99designs 
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expected to change by the respective regression coefficient, holding all other independent 
variables in the model constant. For example, the regression coefficient is expressed as: 
 βi = log(µxi+1) – log(µxi), (1) 
where β is the regression coefficient, µ is the expected number of new participants, and 
xi+1 and xi displays the one unit change in the independent variable xi. The difference of 
two logs equals to the log of their quotient; thus, the regression coefficient could be 
interpreted as the log of the ratio of expected counts, which is called incidence rate ratio. 
In other words, exp(β i) is the proportionate increase in the expected number of new 
participants when xi increases by one unit. For example, if β i =1.50, then increasing xi by 
one unit increases the expected number of new participants by 50%, or if β i =0.90, then 
increasing xi by one decreases the expected number of new participants by 10%. 
According to the results in Table 2.4, if we increase the variable time left, for 
example, by one unit, the difference in the logs of expected number of new participants is 
expected to increase by 0.231 unit, while holding other variables in the model constant. 
In other words, if we increase time left by one unit, the rate for the number of new 
participants per day is expected to increase by a factor of 1.259, when all other variables 
are held constant. This result supports H3.b which states that the longer the contest 
duration is, the higher the participation rate will be for a contest. Since one unit increase 
in the number of current participants in a contest, increases the difference in the logs of 
expected number of new participants by 0.042 unit –i.e. the rate for the number of new 
participants per day increases by a factor of 1.043- H4.b is then rejected. Having more 
participants in a contest does not lead to lower rate of participants based on the data. 
Furthermore, the interesting variable in my study is the rated variable, which determines 
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whether a contest organizer has provided any rating feedback to any entries so far. If a 
contest organizer has rated any entry/submission within a contest, the rate for the number 
of new participants per day is expected to increase by a factor of 1.510. This result 
supports H7.b. When potential participants observe that a contest organizer has rated any 
submission in the contest, they are more interested in participating in that contest since it 
seems easier to reveal the preferences of the contest organizer and to have a higher 
chance of winning. 
Table 2.4: Negative binomial regression results  
for the effect of design parameters on the number of new participants per day 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Coefficients (β i) p-value exp(β i) 
Intercept 
-1.286 
(0.243) 0.090 0.276 
Award size (H1.b) 
0.000 
(0.000) 0.189 1.000 
Hard (H2.b) 
-0.078 
(0.323) 0.809 0.925 
Medium 
-0.048 
(0.303) 0.875 0.953 
Time left (H3.b) 
0.231 
(0.049)*** 0.000 1.259 
Number of 
Participants (H4.b) 
0.042 
(0.014)** 0.002 1.043 
Number of entries 
(H5.b) 
0.003 
(0.004) 0.471 1.003 
Blind (H6.b) 
-0.823 
(0.322) 0.011 0.439 
Rated (H7.b) 
0.412 
(0.378)** 0.001 1.510 
Number of rated 
designs (H8.b) 
-0.004 
(0.010) 0.692 0.996 
Log likelihood: -400.552 χ2(9)= 109.21 
Likelihood-ratio test of alpha=0: χ2(1)=196.53, p=0.000 
Standard error in parentheses 
** Significant at p <0.01 *** Significant at p <0.001 
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6 Discussion 
By studying 99designs website where thousands of design contests are run every 
day, I provided some implications for a contest organizer to design her contest more 
effectively. The goal in idea contests is to invite and attract more individuals to 
participate in a contest. The design of a contest could encourage more individuals to enter 
the contest. In my first conjoint study, I attempted to understand how real designers 
contemplate the public information of contest design parameters to decide to enter a 
contest. In addition to award size, difficulty of a project, number of entries, and visibility 
of a contest, feedback system was taken into account as well. Many contests do not have 
any communication method between a contest organizer and participants. The results of 
my study demonstrate that providing feedback from a contest organizer increases the 
likelihood of participants for potential users compared to no feedback. Likewise, peer 
feedback, which is not common in idea contests, increases the likelihood of participation. 
In my second study, I collected online data from 99designs website to see how 
different design parameters affect the number of new participants who join contests every 
day. As a result, when more time is left, more new participants are willing to enter a 
contest. Unlike the common expectation about the intensity of competition in a contest 
and its negative effect on the participation rate, higher number of participants in a contest 
does not lower the number of new participants on 99designs website. Besides, when a 
contest organizer has already provided feedback to any submission/entry in a contest, 
more individuals would be interested in participating in the contest. This result is 
supporting the previous study indicating feedback would increase the likelihood of 
participating for potential contestants. Feedback is a design parameter which has not been 
studied as a factor to motivate more participation in idea contests. My study is the first 
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research investigating the effect of feedback –from either the contest organizer or peers- 
on the likelihood of participating and the participation rate of a contest. Even though the 
optimal design of an idea contest depends on the environment in which the contest is 
running, my research on 99designs website shed lights on the effect of design parameters 
on the motivation of individuals and the relative importance of providing feedback in 
attracting more participants. 
7 Limitations & Future Research 
In my conjoint study, I intended to capture the importance of each design feature 
from the real designers’ perspective. In addition, by scraping data from 99designs website, 
I tried to evaluate the real data to see how the participation rate for idea contests changes 
depending upon different design features. The limitation of both studies is the lack of 
ability to capture the interaction effects of design features as well as how the ability (i.e. 
experience) of designers could alter the expected results. Furthermore, individuals might 
have distinct and different motivations that drive them to participate in an idea contest –
from winning a financial reward to the enjoyment of doing a design task. My studies are 
unable to fully reveal the participants’ motivations. Moreover, the motivations of 
participants may change over time. Individuals may tend to join contests with fewer 
participants or with higher award size. By gaining more experience, they may change 
their strategic behaviors in order to increase their chance of winning. Last but not least, 
the findings of my study are context-based and could not be generalized to other 
examples of idea contests. 
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Chapter 3 
The Effect of Feedback on Idea Quality 
1 Introduction 
Idea contests have common design parameters in practice: award(s) for the 
winner(s), the specification of a problem needed to be solved, the duration of the contest, 
the visibility of entries, and feedback. Feedback is the communication method between a 
contest organizer and participants (or among participants). However, many real idea 
contests lack this feature and contest organizers do not allow any form of communication 
during a contest. For example, InnoCentive1 is the largest problem-solving marketplace 
where organizations are able to post their key challenges and invite a diverse group of 
solvers to submit their innovative ideas and solutions. Big companies and organizations 
such as Booz Allen Hamilton, Eli Lilly, NASA, Cleveland Clinic and etc. partner with 
InnoCentive to outsource their problems to the crowd. A company seeking for innovative 
solutions, can post a problem online, define an award for the best solution, and set a 
deadline for solvers to submit their ideas. For each contest that is always run as blind, it is 
mentioned “after the challenge deadline, the seeker will complete the review process and 
make a decision with regards to the winning solution. All solvers that submit a proposal 
will be notified on the status of their submissions at the end of the contest; however, no 
detailed evaluation of individual submissions will be provided.” No feedback is provided 
during idea contests on InnoCentive platform. 
                                                 
1 See www.innocentive.com 
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However, other platforms, such as Threadless2, enable users to communicate with 
each other and share information through commenting on submissions or sending private 
messages. The user interactions on online platforms could help the sense of community 
among members to be shaped (Bullinger et al., 2010). Contest organizers also, by means 
of platform communication tools, are able to communicate with contestants and provide 
feedback on their entries, which this interaction eventually could lead to a close and 
trusting relationship between a contest organizer and individuals (Zheng et al., 2011), as 
well as to gain learning for individuals (Leimeister et al., 2009). When a contest 
organizer provides feedback on an individual’s submission, the individual can make some 
adjustments and/or improvements to her idea and refine it. Different types of feedback in 
different forms are allowed on Threadless platform. 
Feedback is the information provided by an external source (e.g. a company, 
supervisor, subordinate, co-worker, or peer) regarding aspects of one’s performance or 
output in order to reduce discrepancies between current performance and a goal (Hattie & 
Timperley, 2007; Kluger & DeNisi, 1996). It’s a general communication process in 
which a sender conveys a message, which contains information about the accuracy, 
adequacy, or the quality of a recipient’s output or response, to the recipient (Bourne & 
Bunderson, 1963; Ilgen, Fisher, & Taylor, 1979). In research, feedback is considered a 
directive, learning, incentive or motivational function that impacts behavior and 
performance of individuals (Nadler, 1979; Payne & Hauty, 1955). 
                                                 
2 See www.threadless.com 
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2 Feedback Characteristics 
Feedback could be in different shapes and formats. In the literature, various 
characteristics of feedback are studied in other contexts than idea contests. Brief 
overview of such characteristics are as follows.  
1) Type of Feedback: feedback could be about the behavior or the consequence of 
an individual’s behavior; about an outcome or the process of performing a task;  
2) Feedback Source: feedback could be provided by any source such as managers, 
teachers, supervisors, subordinates, co-workers, peers, researchers, experts, mechanical 
devices, customers and etc. 
3) Feedback Privacy: feedback could be provided publicly, in private, or a 
combination of both; 
4) Feedback Recipient: refers to those who receive feedback such as individuals, 
groups, or combination of both; 
5) Feedback Content: which is the information about the discrepancy between the 
performance of one individual/group and a standard, or the performance of an 
individual/group compared to another individual/group;  
6) Feedback Mechanism: is called feedback medium as well, which describes the 
means of communicating feedback such as verbal, written, graphical and etc. 
7) Feedback Frequency: that refers to how often feedback is provided such as 
daily, weekly, monthly, annually and etc. 
8) Feedback Valence: is defined as “the positive or negative outcome of the 
comparison between an individual's creative performance and situational criteria” (Zhou, 
1998). 
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Since feedback is mostly about the aspects of one’s performance or output in 
order to reduce discrepancies between current performance and a goal, the effect of 
feedback and its characteristics on the performance and motivation of individuals have 
been vastly addressed in the literature. For instance, in the context of psychology and 
organization behavior, providing feedback enhances performance. In organizations, 
leaders use feedback to motivate and direct subordinates’ performance. It is an important 
resource for organizations. After receiving feedback, an employee decides to put more 
effort toward those goals set by the manager or may have more payoffs for her. 
Researchers have investigated how goals, set by managers, influence the behavior of 
employees and how feedback improves organizational productivity. Goals, that should be 
specific and challenging, may impact behaviors through cognitive and motivational way, 
for instance, by motivating individuals to exert more effort to meet task requirements 
(Locke & Latham, 1984). In the literature feedback is shown to be able to increase or 
lower performance of individuals depending on the context (Liden & Mitchell, 1985).  
In the context of education, the effect of feedback on learning and teaching has 
been the principal focus. Winne & Butler (1994) claim that “feedback is information with 
which a learner can confirm, add to, overwrite, tune, or restructure information in 
memory, whether that information is domain knowledge, meta-cognitive knowledge, 
beliefs about self and tasks, or cognitive tactics and strategies.” It is a part of teaching 
process regarding whether a student is performing and learning well in the classroom or 
not. Teachers compare the current condition of a student with a predefined standard, 
student’s prior performance, or to success/failure on doing a task. Feedback should 
answer the questions of “how students are going?” and “where to go next?” It could be 
61 
 
 
about a task, a process of doing a task, about self-regulation, or about a student’s self 
(Hattie & Timperley, 2007). 
3 Feedback’s Effects in General Contests 
In contests and tournaments (both in static and dynamic types), feedback can be 
used to reveal the information of how well players are performing. This information may 
have different impacts on the motivation and performance of participants in various 
conditions. Understanding of such effects is important for a contest organizer interested 
in using feedback during a contest. 
For example, Ederer (2010) studied dynamic tournaments in organizations, in 
which workers compete with each other over a fixed prize, and addressed the effect of 
interim feedback. Interim feedback occurs at usually midway of performing a task when a 
manager (or generally an evaluator) informs workers of their performance and progress 
towards attaining a goal. In their model, two risk-neutral agents compete with each other 
and a risk-neutral principle, interested in maximizing total output of agents, decides 
whether to transmit the information about agents’ performance to them in the middle of a 
two-stage tournament. Ederer demonstrates that depending on the form of effort disutility 
function of individuals, full-feedback policy or no-feedback policy could be used by the 
principle to motivate agents and increase their total output at the end of the second stage. 
Besides, his findings illustrate that interim feedback could be motivational for high-
performers and discouraging for all competitors due to disclosure of asymmetries. 
In a maze-solving experiment, Freeman & Gelber (2010) find that, in the presence 
of performance feedback (both absolute and relative type), low ability individuals 
increased their level of output more when multiple prizes were offered –compared to a 
single prize condition- whereas high ability individuals performed similarly under both 
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prize structures. In the absence of performance feedback, however, the output of both low 
and high ability individuals were quite the same regardless of the prize structure, while 
low ability individuals did not give up on winning a single prize at all. 
Goltsman & Mukherjee (2011) also investigate a dynamic tournament context and 
show that an optimal feedback policy is to disclose the information of agents only if all 
competitors perform poorly at the intermediate stage. Aoyagi (2010) investigate the 
strategic effect of information feedback in a multi-stage tournament when the principle 
privately observes the effort of agents and decides whether to reveal some or all that 
information to the agents before the next stage, depending on the functional form of 
disutility of efforts. 
Ederer & Fehr (2006) conduct an experiment in which agents select efforts over a 
two-period competition and found that providing feedback decreases second-period effort 
of agents. Eriksson, Poulsen, & Villeval (2009) investigated three different feedback 
policies: no feedback, interim feedback, and continuous feedback. They found that 
feedback does not improve feedback, low-performers do not quit the race, and top-
performers do not reduce their effort. 
Genakos & Pagliero (2012) found that revealing information on relative 
performance of competitors induces top-performers to underperform in a dynamic 
tournament even though they might have higher motivation to perform well. Gürtler & 
Harbring (2010) found that if the principal is committed to communicate the performance 
information at the beginning of a contest, then not revealing that information reduces 
agents’ efforts. Furthermore, the principal should always reveal the performance 
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information unless the heterogeneity is so large. However, this revelation would 
discourage low-performers. 
Hannan, Krishnan, & Newman (2008) studied the effect of providing relative 
performance feedback under two schemes of compensation: tournament incentive scheme 
(compensating based on performance rank) and individual incentive scheme. They found 
that relative performance feedback improves the performance of individuals when they 
are compensated based on individual incentive scheme and diminishes their performance 
when compensation is based on tournament incentive scheme. In the absence of relative 
performance feedback, participants performed better under the tournament incentive 
scheme. 
Casas-Arce & Martínez-Jerez (2009) after analyzing sales contests of a company 
found that after relative performance evaluation (RPE) top performers reduced their 
effort since they feel more confident about their winning chance. Likewise, low-
performers decrease their effort when the gap between top runners and low performers 
was large. 
3.1 Feedback in Idea Contests 
The research in this area is so scarce and needs further investigations. Wooten & 
Ulrich (2014) by running real design contests on 99designs website, find that directed 
feedback (in-process feedback) increases the rate of submissions by participants more 
than no feedback and random feedback conditions. Directed feedback, also, decreases the 
variance in quality of ideas submitted, increases the quality of low-quality submissions, 
but does not change the quality of top ideas. Providing feedback, on average, helps 
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individuals to improve the quality of their submissions, increases the average quality of 
all submission, but does not impact the quality of top ideas. 
Halac, Kartik, & Liu (2014) studied some patent races and derived the principal’s 
optimal feedback mechanism that should be full disclosure and a winner-take-all prize or 
no disclosure and splitting award among successes (equal-sharing). Gross (2016) by 
using four thousand winner-take-all commercial logo design contests observed that 
feedback decreases participation (in terms of continuing to compete or quitting the 
contest), improves the quality of subsequent submissions, and increases the total of 
number of high-quality ideas at the end of a contest. Moreover, he suggests that random 
feedback to only a subset of participants leads to more high-quality entries compared to 
complete feedback. 
As mentioned, the effect of feedback on performance could be very 
heterogeneous. Feedback can motivate individuals to put more effort, submit more ideas, 
improve the quality of their submissions, or demotivates them. Revealing asymmetries 
among competitors might affect the behavior of top vs. low performers in a contest and 
could not be helpful in all situations. The only thing that we are sure about feedback in 
the literature is that feedback affects the self-efficacy, motivation, and performance of 
individuals. It is a key challenge for a contest organizer to understand how to attract more 
participants in a contest, how to motivate them to participate more and submit high-
quality ideas, and how to retain them (Battistella & Nonino, 2013).  
Therefore, as a design element in idea contests, which is not being used in many 
real examples, knowing the effect of feedback on the performance of participants is worth 
noting. A contest organizer needs to know: 
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1) Does feedback affect the performance of individuals during an idea contest? 
2) Does feedback affect the quality of ideas submitted? 
3) How do low vs. high performers react toward receiving feedback? 
4) In what form should feedback be provided to contestants? 
Two types of feedback have received significant attention in the literature and in 
practice as well: relative and absolute performance feedback. To study the effects of 
these feedback types and holding other parameters fixed, I designed a single-stage (one 
round), single shot (one submission per participant), with fixed prize idea contest and 
used three feedback mechanisms: no feedback, absolute performance feedback, and 
relative performance feedback. Feedback in my experiment was designed by a jury of 
experts, without any pre-announcement, and was transmitted to participants only one 
time and in a private message. 
In the next section, I review the research on absolute vs. relative feedback and 
explore the effect of such feedback on the performance of individuals. Performance in 
idea contests is usually measured by the number and the quality of ideas a participant 
submits. Since my experiment was single-shot, I defined 1) likelihood of revising ideas 
and 2) quality of ideas generated as the indicator of participants’ performance. My 
findings would help a contest organizer to decide to use proper form of feedback 
(absolute or relative) in a contest.  
4 Related Literature and Hypothesis Development 
According to control theory, when there is a discrepancy between current 
performance and a goal, individuals are motivated to reduce it (Annett, 1969; Podsakoff 
& Farh, 1989). In goal setting theory, feedback helps individuals to exert effort in order 
to attain a goal (Locke & Latham, 1984).Therefore, I can propose that feedback leads to 
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exerting more effort and increasing performance compared to providing no feedback. 
However, in some studies, for example by Eriksson et al. (2009), providing feedback 
does not improve the performance of individuals. Therefore, as revising the ideas is 
similar to the performance, I have: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Providing feedback increases the likelihood of revising ideas in the 
idea contest more than providing no feedback. 
Hypothesis 2: Providing feedback increases the quality of ideas more than 
providing no feedback. 
 
Individuals in top percentile when receive absolute feedback, which is indicating 
that the best idea score is 10, see smaller difference between their score and the best score, 
compared to low percentile participants. Social cognitive theory states that the magnitude 
of discrepancy between an individual’s actual performance and a goal adversely affects 
the performance and effort of the individual (Bandura & Cervone, 1983; Neubert, 1998). 
Thus, I propose that: 
 
Hypothesis 3: Providing absolute feedback rather than no feedback increases the 
likelihood of revising ideas for top percentile participants more than for low 
percentile ones. 
Hypothesis 4: Providing absolute feedback rather than no feedback increases the 
quality of ideas for top percentile participants more than for low percentile ones. 
 
Festinger (1954) social comparison theory states that people compare their 
abilities, opinions and performance with others and based on this comparison adjust their 
level of effort and performance. Therefore, relative performance feedback can help them 
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to improve performance. Barankay (2012) in a study on furniture salespersons found that 
by providing relative performance feedback employees were less likely to increase their 
performance. Azmat & Iriberri (2010) with the data on high school students’ performance 
found that the relative performance information leads to increasing effort by all students. 
However, Eriksson et al. (2009) demonstrate that relative feedback does not change the 
performance of individuals. He claims that low performers when receive the relative 
performance feedback may be discouraged and lower their performance as well as top 
performers who may slack off due to their confidence of winning. On the other hand, top 
performer might not slack off because they can increase their chance of winning by 
exerting a little more effort. Thus, I propose: 
 
Hypothesis 5: Providing relative feedback rather than no feedback increases the 
likelihood of revising ideas for top percentile participants more than for low 
percentile ones. 
Hypothesis 6: Providing relative feedback rather than no feedback increases the 
quality of ideas for top percentile participants more than for low percentile ones. 
 
Festinger (1954) believes that objective information is more useful and helpful 
than comparative information. Moore & Klein (2008) in a lab experiment tested that 
absolute feedback is more influential than relative performance feedback. However, 
Charness, Masclet, & Villeval (2014) show that relative information can stimulate the 
competitive preferences of participants and be more driving. Therefore, I propose that: 
 
Hypothesis 7: Providing absolute feedback increases the likelihood of revising 
ideas more than relative feedback. 
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Hypothesis 8: Providing absolute feedback increases the quality of ideas more 
than relative feedback. 
5 Experimental Design 
In a real idea contest, I investigate how absolute and relative feedback affect the 
performance of participants. I use three different mechanisms –no feedback, absolute 
performance feedback, and relative performance feedback- to find the most useful form 
of providing feedback. A jury of experts without any pre-announcement designed 
feedback in my experiment, and provided feedback to participants only one time and in a 
private message. Participants were undergraduate students studying in a school of 
business of a public university invited to participate in a real idea contest to win $300 
cash prize. Four hundred and ninety eight students (55% male and 45% female) entered 
this contest. Demographic information is shown in Table 3.1. None of participants had 
prior experience in entering such contests before. 
Table 3.1: Demographic information 
 Statistics  Statistics 
Total Participants 498   
Gender 
• Female 
• Male 
 
273 (55%) 
225 (45%) 
Age (in Years) 
• Range 
• Mean 
• Median 
• Std. Dev. 
 
19-23 
21 
21 
2.1 
The theme of the contest was as following: 
“Think about a new student at your college. There are different needs and 
problems he/she may have and face as a new student. Can you come up with a creative 
solution that would help a new student to adapt to the college life? The first best idea will 
receive $300 cash prize. You need to define a problem and describe its importance in 
details, and come up with a creative original solution to solve that problem. Your idea 
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could be a product or service that would be eventually implemented by the college. You 
can only submit one idea.” 
Moreover, participants were told about how the best will be determined. Prior 
research has identified different dimensions for the quality of ideas such as technical 
feasibility (the feasibility to develop the idea with a reasonable price with existing 
technology), novelty (originality of the idea), specificity, demand (market size and 
attractiveness), overall value, and customer benefit (Girotra, Terwiesch, & Ulrich, 2010; 
Poetz & Schreier, 2012).  
Accordingly, I selected 1) Need/problem description (how well a participant 
described the need/problem and how important and appropriate it is), 2) Solution novelty 
(how novel and original the idea is), 3) Solution feasibility (how feasible it is for the 
college to implement that idea with the existing technology) and 4) Overall value. The 
quality score of ideas was calculated based on the average scores of these four quality 
dimensions. According to the average score and based on how in general an idea is 
innovative, judges chose a score from 1 to 10 an indicator of overall quality of an idea 
which later on was used as a feedback given to some participants. 
All participants had four weeks to submit their best ideas. There was no pre-
announcement of receiving feedback. Each idea submitted was evaluated by a panel of 
two judges based on a Likert scale from 1 to 10 for all four dimensions. All ideas 
evaluated were ranked on the quality score, which was a number between 1 and 10. Then, 
three different percentiles were identified: bottom 25% of all participants, above 75%, 
and the middle percentile. Three different conditions of feedback –no feedback, absolute 
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feedback, and relative feedback- were assigned randomly to the participants in each three 
percentiles. The content of feedback was as follows. 
1) Absolute Feedback: “Judges evaluated your idea (based on the quality 
criteria); your idea quality is X out of 10 (10 is the score of the best idea and 1 is the 
score of the worst idea). 
2) Relative Feedback: Judges evaluated your idea (based on the quality 
criteria); your idea quality is at the Xth percentile (meaning that your idea is better than 
X% of other participants and worse than (100-X)% of them). 
After random assignments of feedback, all participants were asked if they are 
willing to revise their ideas and make some improvements, regardless of feedback type 
they received. They were given one week to revise and resubmit. After one week, another 
panel of two judges evaluated all ideas again and scored them based on four idea quality 
dimensions. The inter-rated reliability (Krippendorff, 2007) was tested for the first panel 
(α1), the second one (α2), and the difference between two panels for all unchanged ideas 
(α3). The process of this experiment is shown in Figure 3.1. 
Among 498 participants, 123 individuals received no feedback. The rest (375 
individuals) received some form of feedback: 192 participants the relative feedback and 
183 individuals the absolute feedback. Performance of individuals in idea contests, 
particularly, is defined in terms of number of entries an individual submits and the quality 
of those entries. However, since my contest was single-shot, performance could be 
measured based upon the individuals’ decision to revise and resubmit ideas. If individuals 
decide to revise and resubmit, it means that they are willing to stay active and increase 
their chance of winning. Since the revision may cause some improvements, the quality of 
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revised (or unchanged) ideas was measured as well. Both the average quality and the 
quality of top ideas were considered in the analysis of data. 
 
 
 
 
 
6 Data Analysis and Results 
To test the effect of feedback on the likelihood of revising ideas, I used the logit 
regression with the dependent variable revise and resubmit (RR) and independent dummy 
variables of relative feedback (FR), absolute Feedback (FA), and bottom 25% percentile 
(Q25), and top 75% percentile (Q75). If the quality of initial idea is among the low 25% 
percentile compared to all other ideas, the dummy variable Q25  takes the amount one; 
same as Q75, which indicates whether the quality of initial idea is among top 75% 
percentile. Age, gender, and GPA are covariates in this model: 
 Logit(RR) ~ α0+ α1FR+ α2FRQ25+ α3FRQ75+ α4FA+ α5FAQ25+ α6FAQ75 
+α7Age + α8Gender +α9GPA. 
(2) 
When participants receive any type of feedback, the quality of their idea is 
revealed; otherwise, they do not know about their idea quality. The descriptive 
Posted the 
contest online 
(No Pre-
announcement of 
Receiving 
Feedback) 
Panel I 
Two judges 
rated the 
initial ideas 
Random 
Assignment of 
1) No Feedback 
2) Absolute 
3) Relative 
Panel II 
Two different 
judges rated 
the final ideas 
Four weeks to submit One week for revise 
Krippendorff's alpha  
Need Description (α1 =0.81) 
Solution Feasibility (α1 =0.71) 
Solution Novelty (α1 =0.75) 
Overall Value (α1 =0.78) 
Krippendorff's alpha  
Need Description (α2 =0.78, α3=0.72) 
Solution Feasibility (α2 =0.81, α3=0.76) 
Solution Novelty (α2 =0.74, α3=0.81) 
Overall Value (α2 =0.81, α3 =0.78) 
 
Figure 3.1: The process of idea contest experiment 
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information of idea quality for the whole participants along with those who received no 
feedback, absolute feedback, or relative feedback is depicted in Table 3.2. 
Table 3.2: Descriptive information of initial and revised ideas 
  Statistics # ideas revised Statistics 
Total number 
of ideas 
submitted 
498 
Quality of all initial ideas 
• Min: 1 
• Max: 9 
• Mean: 4.56 
• Median: 5 
• Std. Dev.: 2.39 
• 25% percentile: 3 
• 75% percentile: 7 
238 
Quality of all revised ideas 
• Min: 1 
• Max: 9 
• Mean: 6.11 
• Median: 7 
• Std. Dev.: 2.21 
• 25% percentile: 5 
• 75% percentile: 8 
# ideas received 
no feedback 123 
 0   
# ideas received 
absolute 
feedback 
183 
Quality of initial ideas 
• Min: 1 
• Max: 9 
• Mean: 4.50 
• Median: 5 
• Std. Dev.: 2.38 
• 25% percentile: 3 
• 75% percentile: 7 
86 
Quality of revised ideas 
• Min: 2 
• Max: 9 
• Mean: 6.73 
• Median: 7 
• Std. Dev.: 1.73 
• 25% percentile: 6 
• 75% percentile: 8 
# ideas received 
relative 
feedback 
192 
Quality of initial ideas 
• Min: 1 
• Max: 9 
• Mean: 4.58 
• Median: 5 
• Std. Dev.: 2.38 
• 25% percentile: 3 
• 75% percentile: 7 
152 
Quality of revised ideas 
• Min: 1 
• Max: 9 
• Mean: 4.56 
• Median: 5.76 
• Std. Dev.: 2.37 
• 25% percentile: 4 
• 75% percentile: 8 
 
By looking at the table above, we can infer that providing feedback to the 
participants increases the likelihood of revising ideas. None of those participants who 
received no feedback attempted to revise their ideas, which makes sense since the quality 
of their ideas was unknown and they did not know whether the idea quality was among 
up or low percentile. In addition, those who received relative feedback were more likely 
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to revise their ideas (79% of them) than those who received absolute feedback (47%). 
However, according to the results of logit regression shown in Table 3.3, we can see that 
although switching from no feedback to either relative (FR) or absolute (FA) feedback 
increases the likelihood of revising ideas; the effects are not statistically significant. 
Therefore, we cannot support H1. Similarly, H5 and H7 are not supported either. 
Table 3.3: Logit regression results for the likelihood of revising idea  
comparing low vs. top percentiles 
 Logit Coefficients (αi) 
p-value Odds Ratio 
Incremental 
effect on 
probability of 
revising an 
idea 
Intercept 
-18.53 
(587.40) 0.974 0.00  
Relative Feedback 
(FR) 
19.62 
(587.39) 0.973 8.66×10
7 2.67 
Relative×Lower 
percentile quality 
(FRQ25) 
0.58 
(0.42) 0.166 1.79 0.07 
Relative×Upper 
percentile quality 
(FRQ75) 
0.27 
(0.44) 0.540 1.31 0.03 
Absolute Feedback 
(FA) 
19.59 
(587.39) 0.973 8.41×10
7 2.66 
Absolute×Lower 
percentile quality 
(FAQ25) 
-2.38 
(0.40)*** 0.000 0.09 -0.32 
Absolute×Upper 
percentile quality 
(FAQ75) 
-1.29 
(0.40)** 0.001 0.27 -0.17 
Age 
0.00 
(0.08) 0.978 1.00 0.00 
Gender 
-0.22 
(0.24) 0.361 0.79 -0.02 
GPA 
0.01 
(0.20) 0.961 1.01 0.00 
AIC: 425.68, Log likelihood=-202.83 
Standard error in parentheses 
** Significant at p <0.01 *** Significant at p <0.001 
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The only significant result indicates that receiving absolute feedback for those 
who are among low (25%) or top (75%) percentiles decreases the likelihood of revising 
and the incremental effect of the probability by 0.32 and 0.17, respectively. The 
difference between these coefficients -1.29 and -2.38 based on the likelihood-ratio test is 
statistically significant (∆χ2 =6.49, df=1, p<0.001) showing that providing absolute 
feedback rather than no feedback increases the likelihood of revising ideas for top 
percentile participants more than low percentile ones (supporting H3). Next, consider the 
model of the quality of the ideas the participants submitted. I used a linear regression 
model to find the effect of relative and absolute feedback (and covariates) on the quality 
of revised ideas: 
 Q2 ~ β0+ β1Q25+ β2Q75+ β3FR + β4FA + β5Age + β6Gender + β7GPA. (3) 
where Q2 is the quality of final ideas (mean-centered) regardless of being revised or 
unchanged; Q25 is the dummy variable that shows whether the initial idea quality belongs 
to bottom 25% percentile; and Q75 that is the dummy variable for top 75% percentile. 
The results are shown in Table 3.4. The effect of relative feedback on the quality of final 
idea is positive and statistically significant (β3=1.04, F1,490=63.47, p<0.001) the same as 
absolute feedback with the positive and significant effect (β4=0.57, F1,490=19.25, 
p<0.001). The difference between these two coefficients are statistically significant 
(F2,490=7.46, p<0.001) supporting H2 and rejecting H8. 
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Table 2.4: Linear regression results for the effect of  
feedback types on the final quality 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To test the effect of relative vs. absolute feedback on the low vs. top percentile 
ideas, I use the following model. 
 Q2 ~ γ0+ γ1Q25+ γ2Q75+ γ3FR+ γ4FRQ25+ γ5FRQ75+ γ6FA+ γ7FAQ25+ γ8FAQ75 
+ γ9Age + γ10Gender + γ11GPA. 
(4) 
where Q2 is the quality of final ideas (mean-centered) regardless of being revised or 
unchanged; Q25 is the dummy variable that shows whether the initial idea quality belongs 
to bottom 25% percentile; and Q75 that is the dummy variable for top 75% percentile. 
The results are shown in Table 3.5.  
 Coefficients (β i) p-value t-value 
Intercept 
-0.30 
(0.83) 0.731 -0.36 
Low percentile 
quality 
(Q25) 
-3.42 
(0.118)*** 0.000 -29.02 
Upper percentile 
quality 
(Q75) 
2.02 
(0.13)*** 0.000 15.53 
Relative Feedback 
(FR) 
1.04 
(0.13)*** 0.000 7.96 
Absolute Feedback 
(FA) 
0.57 
(0.13)*** 0.000 4.38 
Age 
0.02 
(0.03) 0.487 0.695 
Gender 
-0.00 
(0.10) 0.987 -0.02 
GPA 
-0.01 
(0.08) 0.889 -0.13 
F-statistic: 286.1 on 7 and 490 df,  p-value: < 0.001 
Standard error in parentheses 
* Significant at p <0.1 ** Significant at p <0.01 *** Significant at p <0.001 
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Table 3.5: Linear regression results for the effect of feedback on  
the low vs. top percentile final quality 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
When no feedback is provided, the mean-centered quality of ideas for those 
participants neither in top nor in bottom percentile (Q25= Q75=0), which I call them 
 Coefficients (γi) p-value t-value 
Intercept 
-0.41 
(0.83) 0.621 -0.49 
Low percentile 
quality 
(Q25) 
-3.01 
(0.23)*** 0.000 -12.68 
Upper percentile 
quality 
(Q75) 
2.64 
(0.25)*** 0.000 10.31 
Relative Feedback 
(FR) 
1.26 
(0.22)*** 0.000 5.68 
Relative×Lower 
percentile quality 
(FRQ25) 
-0.04 
(0.30) 0.886 -0.14 
Relative×Upper 
percentile quality 
(FRQ75) 
-0.73 
(0.32)* 0.026 -2.23 
Absolute Feedback 
(FA) 
1.20 
(0.21)*** 0.000 5.50 
Absolute×Lower 
percentile quality 
(FAQ25) 
-1.03 
(0.30)*** 0.000 -3.39 
Absolute×Upper 
percentile quality 
(FAQ75) 
-0.87 
(0.33)** 0.009 -2.62 
Age 
0.01 
(0.03) 0.686 0.40 
Gender 
-0.02 
(0.10) 0.789 -0.26 
GPA 
-0.01 
(0.08) 0.889 -0.13 
F-statistic: 514.8 on 10 and 487 df,  p-value: < 0.001 
Standard error in parentheses 
* Significant at p <0.1** Significant at p <0.01 *** Significant at p <0.001 
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middle percentile ideas, equals to the sum of the intercept and other covariates 
coefficients. However, when we switch from no feedback to the relative feedback, for the 
middle percentile ideas, the mean-centered quality increases by 1.26, which is statistically 
significant. This change is 1.20 when we switch from no feedback to absolute feedback 
for the middle percentile ideas. If we switch from no feedback to relative feedback and 
from lower percentile ideas to upper percentile ideas, the final quality decreases by 0.69 
but it is not statistically significant; therefore, I cannot accept or reject H6. Similarly, 
when we switch from no feedback to absolute feedback, and from low percentile ideas to 
top percentile ideas, we see an increase in the final quality by 0.16 which is not 
statistically significant using F-test. Thus, I cannot accept or reject H4. 
7 Discussion 
In a field experiment, I explored the effect of relative vs. absolute feedback on the 
performance of participants in an idea contest. I invited undergraduate students to 
participate in a contest to submit their innovative ideas and solutions for a defined 
problem. A jury of experts evaluated the ideas and randomly assigned three types of 
feedback mechanism –no feedback, absolute feedback, and relative feedback- to the 
participants in different percentiles of initial ideas. The goal was to understand how 
(de)motivational the feedback could be in an ideas contest. The performance in my 
experiment was defined based on the decision of participants to revise and resubmit their 
ideas. Although the primary results of the contests shows that providing feedback 
increases the number of participants who revised their ideas, the logit regression results 
were not statistically significant. The only significant result on the likelihood of revising 
ideas was that receiving absolute feedback for those who are among low (25%) or top 
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(75%) percentiles, decreases the likelihood of revising ideas, but increases the likelihood 
of revising ideas for top percentile ideas more than for low percentile ones.  
Feedback, in general, could increase the quality of all ideas in different percentiles 
while relative feedback was more influential than the absolute feedback. Providing 
relative feedback increased the quality of ideas more than absolute feedback. The quality 
of ideas for top vs. low percentile participants changes after receiving relative or absolute 
feedback. Providing relative feedback decreased the final quality of top percentile ideas 
compared to low percentile ones but the results were not statistically significant. Absolute 
feedback increased the final quality of top percentiles compared to low percentile ideas 
but I could not support this finding as well. After obtaining more subjects, I would be 
able to find significant results for my hypotheses. Nonetheless, the findings of my study 
would help a contest organizer to better design her contest in order to have more 
participation with higher quality of submissions. Feedback increases the participation of 
contestants within a contest and may lead to increase in the quality of top ideas. 
8 Future Research 
More research should investigate the effect of feedback on the performance and 
behavior of individuals within idea contests. For instance, pre-announcement of feedback 
and its effect on the performance of participants should be investigated in research 
studies. Whether a contest organizer credibly pre-commits to a feedback policy, studying 
how individuals react to that commitment would be interesting. Some individuals may 
submit their ideas earlier with low quality in order to receive feedback from the contest 
organizer to have enough time to make improvements. Frequency of giving feedback is 
another characteristic that received less attention in idea contest settings. Regular vs. 
random and stochastic revelation of performance needs to be explored. Feedback privacy 
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is very important. Public feedback has been seen to be more effective than private 
feedback in other contexts (B. F. Greene, Willis, Levy, & Bailey, 1978; Welsch, Ludwig, 
Radiker, & Krapfl, 1973). Mihm & Schlapp (2015) recently considered the uncertainty of 
outcome in their analysis. They found that when the contest organizer is concerned about 
contestants’ average performance, providing no feedback or public feedback would be 
optimal option. However, when the company wants the best possible performance but 
performance uncertainty is high, providing private feedback outperforms no feedback and 
public feedback. 
Feedback coming from peers vs. experts needs more investigation as well. In idea 
contest setting, most practical examples use the expert (i.e. contest organizer) feedback 
instead of peer feedback within the contest. How individuals react to the peer feedback is 
an interesting topic for further research. Kluger & DeNisi (1996) discussed the sign of 
feedback as negative or positive feedback and noted that either positive or negative 
feedback could influence the performance of individuals. However, negative and positive 
feedback needs more accurate definition. Hannan et al. (2008) found that the effect of 
relative performance feedback depends on the structure of contest prize. For instance, 
with multiple prizes even low performers may have motivation to increase their effort to 
win the prize; whereas in a winner-takes-all scheme they may quit (Freeman & Gelber, 
2010). Feedback can also affect the creative performance of individuals. Amabile & 
Gryskiewicz (1987) found that supportive and informative feedback could positively 
impact creativity. In some contests, individuals are allowed to submit as many ideas as 
they want. Providing feedback may affect them to generate new and more innovative 
ideas within the contest.
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1 Appendix 
1.1 Conjoint Survey Questions 
Which contest do you prefer to enter according to the described features of each? 
 
(1 of 15) 
Type of contest Blind Unblind 
Complexity of 
project 
Easy Difficult 
Feedback Peers Contest organizer 
Award size $2000 $100 
Number of entries 1000 entries 500 entries 
Contest period 1 day left 6 days left 
Click   
 
(2 of 15) 
Type of contest Blind Unblind 
Complexity of 
project 
Difficult Easy 
Feedback No Feedback Contest organizer 
Award size $500 $2000 
Number of entries 500 entries 10 entries 
Contest period 1 day left 6 days left 
Click   
(3 of 15) 
Type of contest Blind Blind 
Complexity of 
project 
Easy Difficult 
Feedback Peers Peers 
Award size $500 $100 
Number of entries 10 entries 1000 entries 
Contest period 6 days left 1 day left 
Click   
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(4 of 15) 
Type of contest Blind Unblind 
Complexity of 
project 
Difficult Easy 
Feedback No Feedback Contest organizer 
Award size $2000 $100 
Number of entries 1000 entries 10 entries 
Contest period 6 days left 1 day left 
Click   
 
(5 of 15) 
Type of contest Unblind Unblind 
Complexity of 
project 
Difficult Easy 
Feedback Contest 
organizer 
Peers 
Award size $500 $100 
Number of entries 500 entries 500 entries 
Contest period 1 day left 6 days left 
Click   
 
(6 of 15) 
Type of contest Blind Unblind 
Complexity of 
project 
Easy Difficult 
Feedback No Feedback No Feedback 
Award size $500 $2000 
Number of entries 10 entries 500 entries 
Contest period 1 day left 6 days left 
Click   
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(7 of 15) 
Type of contest Unblind Unblind 
Complexity of 
project 
Difficult Easy 
Feedback Peers Contest organizer 
Award size $2000 $500 
Number of entries 10 entries 1000 entries 
Contest period 1 day left 6 days left 
Click   
 
(8 of 15) 
Type of contest Blind Blind 
Complexity of 
project 
Easy Difficult 
Feedback Contest 
organizer 
Peers 
Award size $100 $100 
Number of entries 1000 entries 500 entries 
Contest period 6 days left 1 day left 
Click   
 
(9 of 15) 
Type of contest Unblind Blind 
Complexity of 
project 
Difficult Difficult 
Feedback Peers No Feedback 
Award size $500 $2000 
Number of entries 1000 entries 10 entries 
Contest period 6 days left 1 day left 
Click   
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(10 of 15) 
Type of contest Unblind Blind 
Complexity of 
project 
Easy Easy 
Feedback No Feedback No Feedback 
Award size $2000 $500 
Number of entries 10 entries 500 entries 
Contest period 1 day left 6 days left 
Click   
 
(11 of 15) 
Type of contest Unblind Blind 
Complexity of 
project 
Difficult Difficult 
Feedback Contest 
organizer 
Peers 
Award size $2000 $100 
Number of entries 1000 entries 10 entries 
Contest period 1 day left 6 days left 
Click   
 
(12 of 15) 
Type of contest Unblind Blind 
Complexity of 
project 
Difficult Easy 
Feedback No Feedback Peers 
Award size $500 $2000 
Number of entries 1000 entries 500 entries 
Contest period 1 day left 6 days left 
Click   
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(13 of 15) 
Type of contest Blind Unblind 
Complexity of 
project 
Easy Difficult 
Feedback Contest 
organizer 
Peers 
Award size $500 $100 
Number of entries 500 entries 1000 entries 
Contest period 1 day left 6 days left 
Click   
 
(14 of 15) 
Type of contest Blind Unblind 
Complexity of 
project 
Easy Easy 
Feedback Contest 
organizer 
Peers 
Award size $100 $2000 
Number of entries 10 entries 500 entries 
Contest period 1 day left 1 day left 
Click   
 
(15 of 15) 
Type of contest Blind Unblind 
Complexity of 
project 
Easy Difficult 
Feedback Contest 
organizer 
Contest organizer 
Award size $500 $100 
Number of entries 10 entries 1000 entries 
Contest period 6 days left 6 days left 
Click   
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